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CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 
Mark R. Patterson* 
Abstract: Information is crucial to the functioning of the patent system, as it is for other 
markets. Nevertheless, patent licensing terms are often subject to confidentiality agreements. 
On the one hand, this is not surprising: sellers and buyers do not normally publicize the 
details of their transactions. On the other hand, explicit confidentiality agreements are not 
common in other markets, and they may be particularly problematic for patents. 
Several United States Supreme Court cases have condemned agreements that suppress 
market information, and those cases could be applied to confidentiality agreements in the 
patent context. Of course, confidentiality may sometimes be pro-competitive, particularly 
when it involves only private negotiations. In other contexts, however, and notably in 
arbitration, which is a substitute for open court proceedings, the competitive balance is more 
problematic. Indeed, U.S. patent law mandates that patent arbitration awards be made public 
through the Patent and Trademark Office, though this requirement is generally ignored. 
Information   about   licensing   terms   is   particularly   important   in   one   of   today’s   most  
important patent licensing contexts. The standard-setting organizations that define the 
technologies used in products like smartphones typically require their members to commit to 
license patented technologies that are adopted in standards on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The non-discriminatory element of this commitment is 
difficult for potential licensees to enforce without information about the licensing terms to 
which other licensees have agreed. 
This Article describes the value of patent licensing information and discusses the antitrust 
implications of agreements to keep that information confidential, particularly in the FRAND 
context and in arbitration. The Article also offers several ways in which parties, standard-
setting organizations, and arbitration bodies could seek to avoid the anticompetitive effects of 
confidentiality. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Information is crucial to the functioning of the patent system. The 
validity and value of granted patents are initially unclear,1 and it is often 
                                                     
1. This point has been the subject of recent scholarship addressing it from a variety of 
perspectives. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 76 
(2005); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66 
(2005)   (“As   patent   portfolios   become   more   prevalent,   it   will   be   increasingly   difficult   to   assess  
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through litigation of patents that those issues are clarified. When a 
patentee alleges infringement of its patent, the alleged infringer is free to 
challenge not just the claim of infringement but also whether the patent 
should have been granted at all, and the court will then deliver 
information  about  the  patent’s  validity.  The  importance  of  challenges  to  
patent validity is such that in many circumstances they may not be 
foreclosed by private agreement.2 This is so because the challenges have 
implications not just for the parties to the agreement but for the public. 
Hence, the United States Supreme Court said in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins3 that 
if   challengers   “are  muzzled,   the  public may continually be required to 
pay tribute to would-be  monopolists  without  need  or  justification.”4 
It is not just the validity or infringement of patents, though, but also 
their value, that is often determined through litigation. When a patentee 
prevails in an infringement action, the court is frequently called upon to 
determine  a  “reasonable  royalty.”5 Although other parties need not treat 
a court-determined royalty rate as authoritative, it is likely to be 
persuasive—it is valuable information on which parties base their 
negotiations.6 Royalty rates are also often determined through purely 
private licensing agreements, however, and in that case the parties often 
agree that the information may not be publicly available.7 Or, if the 
parties cannot reach an agreement, they may choose to arbitrate their 
dispute.8 In that case, too, the parties often enter into confidentiality 
agreements that prohibit disclosure of the royalty and other terms that 
result.9 
                                                     
accurately the stand-alone   value   of   individual   patents.”);;   Mark   R.   Patterson, Leveraging 
Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 483 (2012). 
2. See infra section II.A. 
3. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
4. Id. at 670–71 (overruling Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 
836 (1950)). 
5. See 35 U.S.C. § 284  (2012)  (“Upon  finding  for  the  claimant  the  court  shall  award  the  claimant  
damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the 
court.”). 
6. See Jonathan S. Masur, The Use and Misuse of Patent Licenses, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 115, 120 
(2015)   (“[A]ny   negotiation   over   royalties  will   necessarily   be based upon the outcome the parties 
expect  should  the  case  go  to  trial.”  (citation  omitted)). 
7. See infra section I.B. 
8. In the U.S. arbitration of patent disputes is permitted, even as to issues of validity and 
infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a). In many other jurisdictions, arbitration of validity is not 
permitted, see infra text accompanying notes 118–19, but even those jurisdictions typically permit 
arbitration of royalty disputes. 
9. See infra section I.A. 
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In contrast to the judicial limits on agreements preventing validity 
challenges, the courts have not been hostile to confidential royalty 
arrangements. Nevertheless, the two differ only in degree. Extrapolating 
from  the  Supreme  Court’s  statement  in  Lear, even in the royalty context 
“the   public   may   continually be required to pay [greater] tribute to 
would-be   monopolists   without   need   or   justification.”10 The only 
difference   is   that   the   “tribute”   in   the   validity   context   is   all-or-nothing, 
whereas it is a matter of degree for royalties. In the same way that 
licensees without knowledge that a patent is invalid may pay for a 
license to the invention, so may licensees without knowledge of lower 
royalty rates pay higher ones. In the validity context, the underlying 
principle comes from patent law, but this Article contends that in the 
royalty context antitrust law imposes requirements for competition that 
produce a similar result. 
There is no general policy, of course, that all buyers, or licensees, 
should pay the same price. Different royalty rates are a form of price 
discrimination, and the effects of price discrimination are not always 
harmful. Nor, however, are they always beneficial, and the United States 
Supreme Court has issued decisions in recent years that make price 
discrimination in intellectual property more difficult.11 Moreover, when 
information about royalty rates is unavailable, the dispersion of royalty 
rates is likely to be greater than that in other markets, where information 
may be more widely available and competition may provider a greater 
constraint on pricing. 
Furthermore, the usual argument for the beneficial effects of price 
discrimination is that it can allow a seller to maximize profits while still 
making sales to all buyers willing to pay prices above cost.12 That is so if 
the seller can perfectly price-discriminate by matching prices to 
individual   buyers’   willingness   to   pay.   Where   the   buyer   is   an  
intermediate seller, though, its willingness to pay will depend in part on 
                                                     
10. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969). 
11. These decisions have reaffirmed exhaustion/first sale doctrines in both patent law and 
copyright   law.   Impression  Prods.,   Inc.  v.  Lexmark   Int’l,   Inc.,  __  U.S.  __,  137  S.  Ct.  1523   (2017)  
(patent law); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (copyright). In Kirtsaeng, 
the  Court  emphasized  that  “the  Constitution’s  language  nowhere  suggests  that  [copyright’s]  limited  
exclusive right should include a right to divide markets or a concomitant right to charge different 
purchasers  different  prices  for  the  same  book,  say  to  increase  or  to  maximize  gain.”  Id. at 552.  
12. See F.M SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 495  (1990)  (“First- or second-degree discrimination usually leads to larger outputs 
than under simple monopoly, and from there to lower dead-weight losses and improved allocative 
efficiency.”).  Under  first-degree price discrimination, each product is sold at a price matching the 
consumer’s  willingness  to  pay;;  second-degree price discrimination is discrimination on the basis of 
quantity purchased. 
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how much competing buyers are paying for the same good. Consider, for 
example, a smartphone manufacturer deciding how much it is willing to 
pay for a patent license that would allow it to include a particular feature 
on its phones. If manufacturer A pays $X/phone for the feature, 
manufacturer B may not be willing to pay more than $X, because that 
will place it at a cost disadvantage with respect to phones with that 
feature. Perhaps it would be better off seeking to compete on other 
features instead.13 But if manufacturer B does not know how much A is 
paying, it will not be able to make this assessment. Its willingness to 
pay, then, will be distorted, and price discrimination will be imperfect. 
Imperfect price discrimination, in contrast to perfect discrimination, is 
not so likely to be beneficial.14 Therefore, the unavailability of 
comparative price information—in this context, comparative royalty 
information—eliminates much, if not all, of the force of this argument 
for price discrimination. 
Furthermore, one of the most important patent licensing contexts 
today is FRAND licensing, which requires that license terms be fair, 
reasonable, and—crucially—non-discriminatory. Many of the 
technologies used in important products like cellphones and WiFi 
transmission require that different products work together, a process 
facilitated by the many technical standards promulgated by standard-
setting organizations (SSOs), which are generally made up of 
representatives from the industry. When the standards include patented 
technologies, licenses to the relevant patents are needed to comply with 
the standard, leading them to be referred to as standard-essential patents 
(SEPs). As a result, the SSOs typically require members participating in 
the standard-setting process to commit to FRAND licensing for any 
SEPs the members own. These circumstances describe much patenting 
practice today, including the so-called  “smartphone  patent  wars.”15 
The element of FRAND most relevant here is that which requires that 
licenses  be  “non-discriminatory.”  Although  there  is  some  dispute  about  
                                                     
13. The relationships between the availability of price information, price discrimination, and the 
willingness of buyers to participate in markets is explored in Saul Levmore & Frank Fagan, The End 
of Bargaining in the Digital Age, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062794 [https://perma.cc/6KB8-DUE8]. 
14. SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 12,   at   495   (noting   that   output   can   be   reduced   if   a   seller’s  
“ability  to  segregate  marginal  customers  by  reservation  prices  is  quite  imperfect”). 
15. See Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAIR (May 3, 2014), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war 
[http://perma.cc/Y4YM-8CBA]; Richard Waters & Jessica Dye, Apple and Nokia Reboot Patent 
Wars, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/04959354-c7b0-11e6-9043-
7e34c07b46ef [http://perma.cc/F68Q-CGGH]. 
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what exactly that means, different license terms are at least 
problematic.16 For that reason, confidentiality that makes it difficult for 
participants in these markets to determine the license terms that have 
been granted to others is also problematic.17 As described above, license 
terms typically are public only when disputes are litigated. When parties 
resolve disputes through other means, such as arbitration or through 
private licensing negotiations, the results are usually confidential, 
making it difficult for parties to assess whether offer terms are in fact 
non-discriminatory. As the European Commission wrote in its 
November 2017 communication on SEPs and FRAND licensing, 
“[r]ecourse  to  ADR  [alternative  dispute  resolution]  is  often  hampered  by  
unpredictability and criticized for lack of transparency of previous 
decisions.”18 
Commentators have also noted this confidentiality problem in the 
context of arbitration.19 Most of these comments do not offer specific 
                                                     
16. A recent UK case, Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co. [2017] 
EWHC 711 (Pat), distinguished between what it called   “general   non-discrimination”   and   “hard-
edged non-discrimination”  obligations.  The  former,  it  said,  requires  that  rates  do  not  differ  based  on  
the  licensee  but  only  based  “primarily”  on  the  value  of  the  portfolio  licensed.  Id. ¶ 175. Hard-edged 
discrimination,  on  the  other  hand,  “to  the  extent  it  exists,  is  a  distinct  factor  capable  of  applying  to  
reduce a royalty rate (or adjust any licence term in any way) which would otherwise have been 
regarded  as  FRAND.”   Id. ¶ 177. Determining where there is discrimination in either sense would 
require information about rates applicable to different licensees. 
17. See Complaint,  Charter  Commc’ns,  Inc.,  v. Rockstar Consortium US LP, No. l:14-cv-00055-
UNA (D. Del. filed Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/antitrust-
law/Committee%20Documents/Subcommittee%20on%20Standards/20140117%20Charter%20v.%2
0Rockstar%20Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG9V-84PZ]; Vikas Kathuria & Jessica C. Lai, 
Validity of Non-Disclosure Agreements in SEP Licensing, TILEC Discussion Paper DP 2018-004 
(Jan. 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3092219 [https://perma.cc/M53Q-
PPEP]; FAIR STANDARDS ALL., INPUT IN RESPONSE TO EU COMMISSION WORKSHOP ON STANDARD 
ESSENTIAL PATENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW ICT STANDARDIZATION DEVELOPMENTS, HELD ON 
25 JANUARY 2017 5 (2017), http://www.fair-standards.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/ FSA-Input-
Paper-regarding-SEP-Guidelines_29.03.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC4P-2K7H]   (“By   requiring  
extensive secrecy from all licensees, some SEP holders seek to prevent prospective licensees from 
knowing the terms that have been offered to others, and thereby from reliably evaluating whether 
the terms they are negotiating are FRAND.”).   
18. EUROPEAN COMM’N, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE, SETTING 
OUT THE EU APPROACH TO STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS, § 3.4 (2017) (Nov. 29, 2017) 
[hereinafter EC Communication on SEPs]. 
19. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, TRANSPARENCY, PREDICTABILITY, AND EFFICIENCY OF SSO-
BASED STANDARDIZATION AND SEP LICENSING 89 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/ 
documents/20506/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native [https://perma.cc/QVB5-7PNM]; 
Jorge L. Contreras & David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-
Essential Patent Disputes, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 23, 39–41; Yoonhee Kim, Lifting Confidentiality of 
FRAND Royalties in SEP Arbitration, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2014); Mark A. Lemley 
& Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 
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solutions to the confidentiality problem, but Jorge Contreras and David 
Newman suggest that SSOs could require disclosure of FRAND 
arbitrations.20 The European Commission also took up this proposal in 
its communication.21 Although that would be a partial solution, there is 
no indication that SSOs would take such a step.22 In any event, the 
problem extends beyond the FRAND context and beyond arbitration to 
litigation settlements and private licensing. 
This Article argues that where confidentiality injures competition, 
antitrust law offers a solution.23 Antitrust already plays a role in the 
validity context. The United States Supreme Court in FTC v. Actavis, 
Inc.24 addressed a settlement that precluded a validity challenge and said 
that   “patent-related settlement agreements can sometimes violate the 
antitrust   laws.”25 Further, courts and agencies in multiple jurisdictions 
have treated agreements that prevent such challenges to patent validity 
as antitrust violations.26 These decisions have focused on the potential 
for invalidation of patents rather than on patent or royalty information 
per se,27 but outside the patent context the Supreme Court has held that 
                                                     
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1141, 1145–46 (2013) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple 
Approach]. Lemley and Shapiro also note the confidentiality problem more generally in Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2022 (2007) 
[hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup], but their focus is on the effect on royalty rates, not 
on solutions to the confidentiality problem. 
20. Contreras & Newman, supra note 19, at 41. 
21. EC Communication on SEPs, supra note 18, §§ 1.2.1, 3.4. 
22. The 2015 amendments to the FRAND policy of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers (IEEE) were quite controversial. See Jorge L. Contreras, IEEE Amends Its Patent 
(FRAND) Policy, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 9, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/amends-patent-
policy.html [http://perma.cc/PYT2-3P4H].   Since   then   other   SSOs   have   not   followed   the   IEEE’s  
lead, despite calls for them to do so. Id. 
23. Prior work pointing to the problems of non-disclosure in this context have not advocated an 
antitrust solution. See sources cited in supra note 17. 
24. 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
25. Id. at 137 (citations omitted). Actavis was  of  course  unusual,  involving  a  “reverse-payment”  
settlement of litigation between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers in the 
context of the Hatch-Waxman Act, but the problem is a more general one. See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1722 (2003); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 
67 VAND. L. REV. 375,  409   (2014)   (observing   that   reverse  payment   settlements  “are  not   the  only  
type   of   patent   settlements   to   raise   antitrust   concerns”).  Moreover,   one   of   the   cases   cited   by   the  
Court in Actavis was more directly analogous, as is discussed below. See infra text accompanying 
notes 151–154. 
26. See Thomas K. Cheng, Antitrust Treatment of the No Challenge Clause, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENTER. L. 437 (2016). 
27. For an earlier discussion of Actavis as presenting a specifically informational problem, see 
Patterson, supra note 1. 
09 - Patterson.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:40 PM 
834 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:827 
 
agreements that suppress price and other important market information 
can be antitrust violations.28 Combining these two sets of decisions—
those condemning anticompetitive patent settlements and those 
condemning private agreements suppressing information—reveals the 
policy justifications for applying antitrust scrutiny to confidentiality 
agreements in patent dispute resolution. 
Part I of this Article outlines the nature of confidentiality in patent 
dispute resolution, addressing both arbitration and private litigation 
settlements and licensing. Among the points discussed in this part is a 
widely ignored section of U.S. patent law requiring public filings of 
arbitration awards. Part II then discusses generally the competitive 
implications of confidentiality in patent dispute resolution, emphasizing 
particularly arbitration and the FRAND context. This portion of the 
Article also draws an analogy between confidentiality agreements and 
reverse-payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. Part III then 
analyzes how antitrust law would treat both agreements on 
confidentiality and unilateral suppression of information about patent 
disputes, with a focus on patent information as the relevant market. 
Finally, Part IV outlines some approaches for eliminating the 
confidentiality concerns while still retaining the benefits of resolving 
patent disputes without litigation, and particularly through arbitration. 
I. CONFIDENTIALITY AND PATENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The transparency of patent dispute resolution differs dramatically 
between litigation and other forms of dispute resolution. The results of 
courtroom litigation are rarely confidential. Although parties sometimes 
seek to seal not just filings but also court decisions, those attempts 
seldom succeed.29 In contrast, patent licenses, settlements of patent 
litigation, and arbitration of patent disputes all are often accompanied by 
confidentiality agreements. Such agreements are not always entirely 
effective, because courts in subsequent proceedings may allow discovery 
and sometimes admission of the information at issue. But even if parties 
can ultimately obtain access to arbitration awards, settlements, or 
licenses by initiating subsequent litigation, the need for litigation to 
overcome confidentiality imposes a considerable cost and burden. 
                                                     
28. FTC  v.   Ind.  Fed’n  of  Dentists,  476  U.S.  447  (1986);;  Nat’l  Soc’y  of  Prof’l  Eng’rs  v.  United  
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
29. ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALING COURT RECORDS AND 
PROCEEDINGS: A POCKET GUIDE (2010), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Sealing_ 
Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ9G-CA64]. 
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The paragraphs below discuss these aspects of confidentiality. The 
first section describes the nature and scope of confidentiality agreements 
in both the arbitration and settlement/licensing contexts. The second then 
discusses the extent to which the results of dispute resolution will be 
available despite confidentiality agreements. The goal in these first two 
sections is not to present an exhaustive description of the applicable 
rules, even in the U.S., but simply to illustrate the obstacles imposed by 
confidentiality. The final section concludes by describing how the effect 
of confidentiality clauses can be viewed as imposing a cost on 
uninformed licensees that places them at a competitive disadvantage. 
A. Confidentiality Agreements in Patent Dispute Resolution 
A court seldom denies the public access to litigation documents, and 
when  it  does,  the  decision  to  do  so  is   the  court’s,  not  the  parties’.  That  
gives some reason to believe that the decision will be made with 
reference to the public interest. Outside the courtroom, however, parties 
typically exercise control over whether the resolution of their dispute is 
confidential, whether it comes through arbitration, pre-litigation 
licensing, or settlement of litigation. That makes it less likely that the 
confidentiality decision will be in the public interest. 
1. Arbitration 
Although confidentiality is often said to be one of the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration, the rules of most arbitration bodies do not 
require confidentiality.30 As many commentators point out, it is privacy, 
not confidentiality, that is an essential part of arbitration.31 That is, 
although the process takes place behind closed doors—it  is  “private”  in  
that sense—the parties must generally enter into a separate agreement to 
                                                     
30. They do not require confidentiality from the parties; they do generally require confidentiality 
from the arbitration tribunal itself. See Scott D. Marrs & Joseph W. Hance III, You Thought 
Arbitration Was Confidential?: A Practical Comparison of Confidentiality (or Lack Thereof) in 
Major Arbitration Forums, 77 TEX. BAR J., 152, 152–56 (2014); David Perkins, Protective Orders 
in International Arbitration, 33 ASA BULL. 274,  274  (2015)  (“[B]oth  the  UNCITRAL  Model  Law  
and   most   national   arbitration   legislation   are   silent   on   issues   of   confidentiality.”).   In   some  
jurisdictions, there is arguably an implied duty of confidentiality, but there are sometimes 
exceptions, and it is also often unclear what law will apply to subsequent efforts seeking disclosure. 
See Jeffrey W. Sarles, Solving the Arbitral Confidentiality Conundrum in International Arbitration, 
at 3–5, https://www.josemigueljudice—arbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_ARBITRAGEM/ 
01_Doutrina_ScolarsTexts/confidentiality/Confidentiality_in_International_Arbitrations_-
_Sarles.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG3K-P943].  
31. See Sarles, supra note 30; M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity 
Issues Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 315–18 (2006). 
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keep the proceedings confidential. In the absence of such an agreement, 
either of the parties would typically be permitted to reveal information 
from the arbitration, though the tribunal itself is generally bound to 
confidentiality.32 
The scope of a typical confidentiality agreement between parties to 
arbitration can be illustrated by a recommended provision: 
The parties shall maintain the confidential nature of the 
arbitration proceeding and the Award, including the Hearing, 
except as may be necessary to prepare for or conduct the 
arbitration hearing on the merits, or as may be necessary in 
connection with a court application for a preliminary remedy, a 
judicial challenge to an Award or its enforcement, or unless 
otherwise required by law or judicial decision.33 
Under this provision, neither party would be permitted, in the absence of 
a legal obligation,34 to disclose information about the arbitration to 
others without the permission of the other party. 
The quoted confidentiality provision is one recommended by 
practitioners because confidentiality is viewed by many as a benefit of 
arbitration, in general and in the patent context. It is not entirely clear, 
however, to what extent confidentiality really is viewed as essential by 
parties to arbitration.35 Some descriptions of the advantages of 
arbitration do not even mention confidentiality.36 Moreover, a study by 
the Queen Mary School of International Arbitration found that only 35% 
of respondents would not use arbitration if results were not 
confidential,37 and 65% said that a lack of confidentiality in court was 
not a principal reason for choosing arbitration.38 
                                                     
32. Marrs & Hance III, supra note 30, at 152–56. 
33. Id. 
34. For discussion of whether a court would order discovery of the arbitration award or other 
materials, see infra section I.B.2.  
35. Stefano Azzali, Confidentiality vs. Transparency in Commercial Arbitration: A False 
Contradiction to Overcome, TRANSNAT’L NOTES (Dec. 28, 2012), http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/ 
transnational/2012/12/confidentiality-vs-transparency-in-commercial-arbitration-a-false/ 
[http://perma.cc/ACL3-CQ3L]. 
36. See, e.g., SEC. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ABA, PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES 
HANDBOOK 85–88 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 3d ed. 2010) (listing speed, 
affordability, flexibility, choice of decisionmaker, and control over the process as reasons to 
arbitrate). 
37. Of the others, 38% said they would still use arbitration, and 26% did not know. SCH. OF INT’L 
ARBITRATION, QUEEN MARY UNIV. OF LONDON, 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: 
CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 30 (2010), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/ 
arbitration/docs/2010_InternationalArbitrationSurveyReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/FET3-AF25]. 
38. Id. 
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In fact, there is arguably a move toward greater transparency in 
arbitration, as evidenced by the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, known as the 
“Mauritius   Convention   on   Transparency.”39 States parties to the 
convention agree to apply the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.40 Those rules provide for 
publication (or, in the case of expert reports, availability) of documents, 
including awards, from the arbitration.41 The rules also provide, 
however,   that   “confidential   business   information”   shall   not   be   made  
public.42 The convention and rules therefore hardly reflect a wholesale 
adoption of transparency, but they do reflect some recognition that 
confidentiality need not be an essential part of arbitration. 
The investor-state arbitration context is very different from the patent 
one, of course, and the respondents to the Queen Mary study cited above 
appeared to consider information related to intellectual property as 
particularly sensitive.43 Another  commentator  notes  that  “[in  arbitration,  
it is more likely that secret   information   will   remain   confidential”   and  
that  “[s]pecifically  in  patent  validity  disputes,  parties  are  more  likely  to  
keep  silent  to  maintain  their  technology  advances.”44 
In the FRAND context, though, and in pure royalty disputes more 
generally, where validity is not at issue, there is no question of keeping 
technology secret. Furthermore, some commentary points to costs of 
confidentiality that are directly relevant to the patent context, and 
particularly to FRAND licensing: 
[C]onfidentiality of arbitral decisions may lead to inconsistent 
resolution of disputes arising out of the same business 
transaction but decided by different arbitral tribunals. This 
carries the risk of conflicting awards. In these circumstances, 
more transparency is desirable, especially for the stakeholders in 
                                                     
39. UNCITRAL, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON TRANSPARENCY IN TREATY-BASED 
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION (2014), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
2014Transparency_Convention.html [http://perma.cc/8QE7-T234].  
40. UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration 
(effective Apr. 1, 2014). 
41. Id. art. 3. 
42. Id. art. 7. The scope of this provision is not entirely clear. Where royalty rates are the issue in 
dispute, they might or might not be viewed as confidential business information. In that respect, 
they could be distinguished from, for example, trade secrets. 
43. Id. at 31. 
44. Wei-Hua Wu, International Arbitration of Patent Disputes, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. 384, 403 (2011). However, royalty   rates   presumably  would   not   be   viewed   as   “technology  
advances.” 
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order to benefit of [from?] documents and information relevant 
to each of the disputes.45 
These benefits of transparency are surely apparent to parties to patent 
disputes, so it is possible that there is simply a collective-action problem. 
Some parties, or some classes of parties, like licensees, might prefer a 
world in which arbitration, like litigation, was a public process, but they 
are unlikely to prefer that only their own arbitrations be public. Hence, 
since parties to one arbitration have no ability to ensure that others are 
public, they will keep their own arbitrations confidential. In that sense, 
there may be a market failure that leads the parties to this result. As will 
be discussed below, this failure could and perhaps should be remedied 
by any of the actors that are involved in these disputes: standard-setting 
bodies, courts, or arbitration organizations.46 
A fundamental point of this Article, though, is that even if 
confidentiality is preferred by the parties to dispute resolution, it may not 
be beneficial to the public. Indeed, U.S. patent law requires that patent 
arbitrations be public.47 Section 294 of the Patent Act requires that when 
a patent dispute is arbitrated, a notice including a copy of the award 
“shall”   be given to the Director of the Patent and Trademark Office.48 
The  Director   then  “shall”  enter   the  notice   in   the  prosecution  history  of  
“each   patent   involved   in   such   proceeding.”49 This requirement is, 
however, widely ignored.50 The reason for the non-compliance, 
presumably, is that the only penalty is that the award is unenforceable.51 
When parties ignore this requirement, they apparently benefit 
sufficiently from keeping their resolution confidential so that neither 
discloses the award,52 but the fact that parties do not typically comply 
                                                     
45. Azzali, supra note 35. 
46. See infra sections IV.C–E. 
47. The U.S. (unlike many other jurisdictions) allows arbitration of patent disputes, even those 
“relating  to  patent  validity  or  infringement.”  35  U.S.C.  § 294(a) (2012).  
48. Id. § 294(d). 
49. Id. 
50. An  inquiry  to  the  PTO’s  Office  of  the  Solicitor  produced  the  information  that  “one,  or  two,  or  
maybe  three”  such  filings  are  made  each  year. Telephone Interview with PTO Office of the Solicitor 
Employee (further information on file with author). Even in instances where a filing is made, it 
might not provide useful information. For example, in the filing in the prosecution history of U.S. 
Patent No. 5,648,477, the arbitration award is redacted.  
51. 35 U.S.C. § 294(e). 
52. There have been occasions in which parties have sought to enforce arbitration awards in the 
U.S., so there is presumably some potential for the absence of a filing to cause difficulty in that 
situation. See Martyn Williams, Nokia Seeks to Block Sale of Some RIM Products, 
COMPUTERWORLD (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2492458/data-
center/nokia-seeks-to-block-sale-of-some-rim-products.html [http://perma.cc/A3M9-XD5C]; 
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with the disclosure requirement should give us pause. Even if there are 
private benefits to the parties from keeping the resolution of patent 
disputes confidential, that confidentiality does not necessarily benefit the 
public.53 If parties prefer that their patent arbitrations be confidential, 
that preference may be one for competitive advantage rather than for a 
more defensible reason. 
2. Settlement and Licensing 
Many patent disputes are resolved through litigation settlements or 
private licensing rather than through arbitration or litigation to judgment. 
In some cases, litigation may be initiated, but the parties subsequently 
settle the case through private agreement. In others, the parties may 
come to a private agreement on licensing terms without any formal 
dispute resolution. These circumstances present somewhat different 
issues than arbitration, particularly in evaluating the potential benefits of 
secrecy,54 but these private forms of dispute resolution are, as with 
arbitration, often confidential. 
The absence of transparency in the settlement context has been 
recognized   for   many   years,   most   notably   in   Owen   Fiss’s   1984   article  
“Against  Settlement.”55 The issue has been taken up more recently both 
in the patent56 and arbitration57 contexts. However, the primary concern 
of Fiss and others has been the legitimacy of confidential dispute 
resolution, and the focus in the present article is different. The focus here 
is on the competitive implications of confidentiality, given the 
importance of information to the functioning of markets. 
As  with  arbitration,  “[p]arties  regularly  opt  to  keep  terms,  conditions  
and licensing agreements confidential when settling patent infringement 
disputes.”58 As will be discussed below, the effectiveness of such 
                                                     
Parties Agree to Dismiss Petition to Confirm Swedish Arbitration Award (Jan. 29, 2013), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/international-law/b/international-law-
headilnes/archive/2013/01/29/parties-agree-to-dismiss-petition-to-confirm-swedish-arbitration-
award.aspx [http://perma.cc/U7SL-9AQP] (noting settlement of that case).  
53. See La Belle, supra note 25; Patterson, supra note 1. 
54. See infra section III.C. 
55. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
56. La Belle, supra note 25; Patterson, supra note 1. 
57. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Against International Settlement?: The Social Cost of Secrecy 
in International Investment Arbitration (Jan. 2016), http://pages.ucsd.edu/~ehafner/pdfs/ILAR_ 
Working_Paper_26.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGV7-BKRM]. 
58. James Amend, Protecting Confidentiality of Patent Infringement Settlements: Is Mediation 
Necessary?, (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.law.com/sites/jamesamend/2014/11/03/protecting-
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provisions, like those for confidentiality of arbitrations, is not entirely 
clear,  but  the  provisions  are  similar,  as  this  example  from  a  “Settlement  
and  Patent  License  Agreement  and  Mutual  Release”  shows: 
5.3 The contents, but not the mere existence[,] of this 
Agreement are and shall be kept confidential by the Parties and 
their Affiliates. Philips shall be permitted to list the Licensee on 
a Philips website identifying the Licensee as having obtained a 
license under the Philips SSL Luminaire and Retrofit Bulb 
License Program. [redacted] 
5.4 No confidentiality obligation shall apply to the extent 
information so acquired: 
. . . 
(iv) must be disclosed pursuant to an order of a competent court 
or administrative authority or pursuant to any mandatory law.59 
Licensing agreements in the absence of litigation typically have similar 
provisions.60 
The agreement quoted above was available because it was included in 
a required securities filing. Securities law requires that a party must 
include as exhibits to its filings material agreements that were not 
entered into in the ordinary course of business.61 This requirement might 
be expected, then, to result in the disclosure of the terms of many 
significant license agreements.62 However, license terms may remain 
undisclosed because the filing party may request, and receive, 
                                                     
confidentiality-of-patent-infringement-settlements-is-mediation-
necessary/?slreturn=20170104132207 [http://perma.cc/B3S8-59AY].  
59. Nexxus Lighting, Inc., Settlement and Patent License Agreement (Exhibit No. 10.1 to Form 
10-Q) (Nov. 14, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/917523/000119312512469039/ 
d422675dex101.htm [https://perma.cc/DUT2-CHPS]. 
60. For  example,  a  license  agreement  between  Scient’x  S.A.  and  Alphatec  Spine  Inc.  contains  this  
clause:  
Except as otherwise provided herein or required by law, no party shall originate any 
publication, news release or other public announcement, written or oral, whether in the public 
press,   stockholders’   reports,   or   otherwise,   relating   to   this   Agreement   or   to   any   sublicense  
hereunder, or to the performance hereunder or any such agreements, without the prior written 
approval of the other party, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld.  
Alphatec Holdings, Inc., License Agreement (Exhibit No. 10.21 to Form 10-K) (Apr. 2, 2007), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1350653/000119312507072229/dex1021.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6TSA-KDN2]. 
61. Regulation S-K, Item 601(b)(10), describes the contracts required as exhibits: 
Every contract not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the registrant 
and is to be performed in whole or in part at or after the filing of the registration statement or 
report or was entered into not more than two years before such filing.  
17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2016). 
62. See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 19, at 2022. 
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confidential treatment for important information in the filing.63 
“Common   examples   of   this   kind   of   information   include   pricing   terms,  
technical   specifications   and   milestone   payments.”64 As a result, the 
relevant licensing terms of the contracts included as exhibits may in fact 
be redacted, as they were in both the agreements cited above.65 
Settlements and licenses differ from arbitration awards in a number of 
respects, but an important one is the time at which the parties agree on 
confidentiality. Settlements and licenses are agreements on particular 
terms, so when parties include a confidentiality provision in such an 
agreement, they do so with knowledge of those terms. In arbitration, 
however, the parties typically enter into a confidentiality agreement 
when they agree to arbitrate, when the royalty or other terms are as yet 
undetermined.66 As a result, parties entering into licenses and settlements 
can make decisions on confidentiality based on how favorable are the 
terms   they   have   received.  One   commentator   says   that   often   “patentees  
do not want the license terms to serve as precedent in other assertions of 
the  patent(s),”67 but that will depend, of course, on whether the terms are 
favorable or not. For example, a patentee might insist on confidentiality 
when it accepts a low royalty rate but negotiate for disclosure when it 
receives a high one. Licensees would surely be a constraint on this 
practice   because   licensees   “may   also   not   want   other   potential   patent  
plaintiffs  to  believe  they  are  a  ‘soft  touch,’”68 but the point is that there 
are opportunities for gaming the disclosure in a way that also 
exacerbates the potential competition problems. 
B. Limits on Confidentiality 
A confidentiality agreement between parties resolving a patent 
dispute will not always maintain confidentiality. Most importantly, as 
the confidentiality clauses quoted above illustrate, legal requirements 
                                                     
63. SEC DIV. OF CORP. FIN., STAFF LEGAL BULLETIN NO. 1 (WITH ADDENDUM), “CONFIDENTIAL 
TREATMENT REQUESTS” (Feb. 28, 1997), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/slbcf1r.htm 
[http://perma.cc/X3EQ-XMD4].  
64. Ze’-ey D. Eiger, et. al., Frequently Asked Questions About Confidential Treatment Requests, 
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP (2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/faq-confidential-
treatment-requests.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZJ7-7M7P]. 
65. That is true, for example, for the contract quoted in supra note 60. 
66. Sarles, supra note 30, at 2 (observing that with pre-dispute arbitration  agreements,  “[i]f  [the  
parties] do think about the confidentiality issue, they may be unsure what their position would be in 
the  context  of  a  particular  dispute  and  its  arbitral  resolution”). 
67. Amend, supra note 58. 
68. Id. 
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such as court orders or discovery obligations may require disclosure of 
information that the parties have agreed to keep confidential. As the 
paragraphs below explain, however, the law in this area is not very clear, 
with courts often, but not always, ordering disclosure. Even if courts 
were always willing to issue such orders, though, confidentiality 
agreements would still be important, because many disputes do not, or 
do not immediately, come before a court, as discussed in the subsequent 
section. 
1. Discovery and Admissibility in Court 
In the U.S., the tests for discovery and admissibility of patent-related 
agreements are generally decided by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit.69 The rules for settlements, licenses, and 
arbitration documents differ, to the extent that those rules can be 
determined. The Federal Circuit has addressed a number of cases on 
settlements and license agreements, and although it has found both 
admissible in certain circumstances, it has been more willing to allow 
agreements that did not involve litigation. With respect to arbitration, the 
law both in the U.S. and in other countries is even less clear. 
The Federal Circuit has issued a series of not-always-consistent 
decisions on discovery of settlement agreements and negotiations, and 
many of these decisions have focused on the relevance of such discovery 
to royalty rates. The court has indicated that both patent law and 
evidence law have changed significantly enough so that it is not bound 
by  the  Supreme  Court’s  130-year-old  statement   that  “[i]t   is  clear  that  a  
payment of any sum in settlement of a claim for an alleged infringement 
cannot be taken as a standard to measure the value of the improvements 
patented, in determining the damages sustained by the owners of the 
patent  in  other  cases  of  infringement.”70 
The  Federal  Circuit’s  approach  to  the  issue relies both on the rules of 
evidence and on the context of the agreement. Some authors have 
suggested that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 prohibits the introduction 
                                                     
69. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Med-tronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(“As   to   discovery  matters,  we   have  held   that   Federal  Circuit   law   applies  when   deciding  whether  
particular written or other materials are discoverable in a patent case, if those materials relate to an 
issue  of  substantive  patent  law.”). 
70. Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 164 (1889), discussed in Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint 
Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1371–73 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
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of settlement agreements.71 But Rule 408 makes inadmissible evidence 
of   “furnishing,   promising, or offering—or accepting, promising to 
accept, or offering to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising 
or attempting to compromise the claim,”72 which appears to focus on 
settlement of the claim at issue, not settlement of prior, related claims. 
On   this   point,   the   Federal   Circuit   states   that   “[t]he   propriety   of   using  
prior settlement agreements to prove the amount of a reasonable royalty 
is   questionable,”   but   apparently   as   a   result   not   of  Rule   408  but   of   the  
settlement context, which makes it difficult to determine whether any 
payments were in exchange for use of the technology or in exchange for 
termination of litigation.73 
For that reason, the Federal Circuit has instead balanced the probative 
value of the prior settlement agreement with possible prejudicial effects 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. In its most recent case on the issue, 
it   noted   the   obvious   “strong   connection   a   settlement   can   have   to   the  
merits   of   an   issue   common   to   the   earlier   and   later   suits,”74 but it also 
emphasized other considerations: 
                                                     
71. Jackson Taylor Kirklin & Tejas N. Narechania, Beyond ResQNet: Clarifying the Standard for 
the Use of Patent Settlements, 6 LANDSLIDE 22 (2014), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/ 
landslide/2013-14/january-february/beyond_resqnet.html [https://perma.cc/34B8-Z563]. 
72. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(1) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 111 
F.3d  758,  770  (10th  Cir.  1997)  (“Rule  408  does  not  require  the  exclusion  of  evidence  regarding  the  
settlement of a claim different from the one litigated, though admission of such evidence may 
nonetheless implicate the same concerns of prejudice and deterrence of settlements which underlie 
Rule  408.”)  (citations  omitted).  But see Kennon v. Slipstreamer, Inc., 794 F.2d 1067, 1069 (5th Cir. 
1986)  (“While  a  principal  purpose  of  Rule  408  is  to  encourage  settlements  by preventing evidence 
of a settlement (or its amount) from being used against a litigant who was involved in a settlement, 
the rule is not limited by its terms to such a situation. Even where the evidence offered favors the 
settling party and is objected to by a party not involved in the settlement, Rule 408 bars the 
admission  of  such  evidence  unless  it  is  admissible  for  a  purpose  other  than  ‘to  prove  liability  for  or  
invalidity  of  the  claim  or  its  amount.’”  (emphasis  in  original)  (citations  omitted)).  The  decisions on 
this issue are fact dependent, but cases in which courts exclude evidence of settlements appear 
generally to be those in which a party argues that a prior settlement has or has not already 
compensated, fully or partially, a claimant. See, e.g., Portugues-Santana  v.  Rekomdiv  Int’l,  657  F.3d  
56, 63 (1st Cir. 2011); Kennon, 794 F.2d at 1069. 
73. LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 77 (Fed. Cir. 2012). This has 
not, however, prevented some lower courts from admitting such evidence. High Point SARL v. 
Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2012 WL 234024 (D. Kan. Apr. 30, 2012); SPH Am., 
LLC v. Acer, Inc., Civil No. 09cv2535 JAH (AJB), 2010 WL 11508569 (S.D. Cal., Nov. 19, 2010); 
John Kenneth Felter & Samuel Brenner, Settlement Evidence and Patent Damages, TRIAL EVID. 
(2013) (“Although  the  federal  courts  have  not  spoken  unanimously,  the  trend  is  to  allow  discovery 
of both settlement license agreements and settlement license negotiations. There is less agreement 
regarding whether and in what circumstances agreements and negotiations are admissible at  trial.”). 
74. Prism Techs. LLC v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 849 F.3d 1360, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations 
omitted). 
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On the other side of the balance, for various reasons a settlement 
may be pushed toward being either too low . . . or too 
high . . . relative to the value of the patented technology at issue 
in a later suit. As to the former, for example, even if the 
technology is identical in the earlier and later suits, the earlier 
suit’s  settlement  figure  may  be  too  low  to  the  extent  that  it  was  
lowered   by   the   patent   owner’s   discounting   of   value   by   a  
probability of losing on validity or infringement. As the 
unchallenged jury instructions in this case indicate, the 
hypothetical-negotiation rubric for the assessment of royalty 
damages assumes that the asserted patents are valid and 
infringed. . . . 
At the same time, various factors may work in the opposite 
direction, tending to make a settlement of an earlier suit too high 
as evidence on the valuation question presented in a later 
suit. . . . The earlier suit may have included a risk of enhanced 
damages,  a  factor  in  the  settling  parties’  assessment  of  risk  that  
would push settlement value above the value of the technology. 
And, of course, the litigation costs still to come at the time of 
settlement  may  loom  large  in  parties’  decisions  to  settle.75 
Ultimately,   then,   the  court  concluded   that  “[t]he  particulars  of   the  case 
that was settled and the settlement, as well as of the case in which the 
settlement is offered as evidence, matter to the Rule 403 balance.”76 
Included in those particulars, perhaps, is the significance of 
confidentiality itself.77 Quoting a Second Circuit decision from the 
mediation context, the court said that,  
[B]ecause “confidentiality in [mediation] proceedings promotes 
the free flow of information that may result in the settlement of a 
dispute,” a party seeking discovery of confidential 
communications must make a heightened showing 
“demonstrat[ing] (1) a special need for the confidential material, 
(2) resulting unfairness from a lack of discovery, and (3) that the 
                                                     
75. Id. at 1369–70. 
76. Id. 
77. See KYRIAKI NOUSSIA, CONFIDENTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSITION UNDER ENGLISH, US, GERMAN AND FRENCH LAW 
27–28 (2010) (discussing two leading cases: United States v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 118 F.R.D. 
346 (D. Del. Jan. 7, 1988), and Contship Containerlines, Ltd. v. PPG Industries, Inc., No. 00-Civ.-
0194 RCCHBP, 2003 WL 1948807 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003), and noting that although both 
allowed   discovery,   “[n]either . . . dealt with situations in which the parties had executed a 
confidentiality  agreement”). 
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need for the evidence outweighs the interest in maintaining 
confidentiality.”78  
The case in which it made this statement involved an attempt to 
introduce evidence of settlement discussions, not just settlement terms, 
though, so it is possible that the court would be more willing to admit a 
settlement agreement itself. 
In contrast to settlement agreements, licenses agreed to in the absence 
of litigation, and thus arguably undistorted by it, are more generally 
admissible.   The   Federal   Circuit’s   concerns   about   admission   of  
settlements relate primarily to the particular distortions that can be 
introduced by the litigation context, as shown in the quotation above. 
Licenses agreed to in the absence of litigation are less likely to be 
subject to those distortions, though the obvious possibility of subsequent 
litigation could presumably have similar effect.79 Licenses are often 
admitted only under seal, though, given that they often contain 
confidential information like royalty rates.80 As a result, admission of a 
license in one litigation (or, of course, one arbitration) may not make it 
generally available, and subsequent litigation may be required to gain 
access to it. 
The availability in court of prior arbitration awards and documents 
from arbitration proceedings is less clear. Some courts have been willing 
to order disclosure of arbitration documents, but in many of these cases 
there was not a confidentiality agreement between the parties.81 That is, 
                                                     
78. Id. (quoting In re Teligent, Inc., 640 F.3d 53, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
79. It is not entirely clear that this consideration is as important as the Federal Circuit treats it, 
though, or at least that settlements and licenses agreed upon outside of litigation differ significantly 
in this respect. As Jonathan   Masur   has   written,   “[p]atent   licenses   are   best   understood   as   civil  
settlements  in  anticipation  of  possible  litigation.”  Masur,  supra note 6, at 127 (citation omitted); see 
also Erik Hovenkamp & Jonathan S. Masur, How Patent Damages Skew Licensing Markets, 36 
REV. LITIG. 379 (2017). 
80. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 11-CV-01846 LHK, 2013 WL 
3958232, at *2–4  (N.D.  Cal.  July  29,  2013)  (granting  a  third  party’s  motion  to  seal  the  portions  of  a  
license   agreement   containing   “information   relating   to   [the  moving   party’s]   pricing   terms,   royalty  
rates,  and  payments”). 
81. After surveying cases, one commentator argues that the absence of an express provision 
leaves the court free to balance private and public interests: 
However, where there is no express provision in favour of confidentiality, but only what has 
been called an implied obligation or what has also come to be recognised as a rule of law rather 
than of contract, then, it seems to me that the law is free to mould the contours of that 
obligation for itself. The shaping of these contours has become increasingly apparent as time 
has gone by: from which it is becoming clear that the implied obligation is not so much an all-
embracing requirement of confidentiality, so much as an accommodation of private and public 
interests with a line to be drawn, wherever possible, in favour of both privacy where that 
matters and also transparency where that matters. 
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the argument for confidentiality was based solely on the fact of 
arbitration. In that context, given that confidentiality is not in fact an 
inherent characteristic of arbitration,82 disclosure is unsurprising. 
Furthermore, many arbitrations required that arbitration documents be 
destroyed following the arbitration, so it is possible that only the award 
itself would be available. If that award did not provide all the 
information in the other documents, discovery of the award alone would 
be of limited value. 
In any event, even within a single court, decisions on these issues can 
differ dramatically. For example, in a case in which a party sought 
confirmation of an arbitration award and both parties moved to keep 
documents apparently from that arbitration under seal, the Seventh 
Circuit in Baxter International, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories83 denied the 
motion without prejudice, but said that the party opposing confirmation 
of   the   award  “had,   and   spurned,   a   sure  path   to  dispute   resolution  with  
complete   confidentiality:   accept   the   result   of   the   closed   arbitration.”84 
Although it is not entirely clear that the court meant to say that 
“complete   confidentiality”   would   also   be   maintained   in   other,  
subsequent cases, the statement appears to support such an 
interpretation. 
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit made a conflicting, and 
sweeping, statement about the availability of arbitration documents in 
discovery in Gotham Holdings, LP v. Health Grades, Inc.85 (an opinion 
from the same Judge Easterbrook): 
Contracts   bind   only   the   parties.   No   one   can   “agree”   with  
someone   else   that   a   stranger’s   resort   to   discovery   under   the  
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be cut off. We applied this 
principle in Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Electric Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 
854 (7th Cir.1994), to confidentiality agreements reached during 
litigation. That conclusion is equally applicable to 
confidentiality agreements that accompany arbitration. Indeed, 
                                                     
Professor Sir Bernard Rix, Confidentiality in International Arbitration: Virtue or Vice?, Jones Day 
Professorship in Commercial Law Lecture at SMU, Singapore 16 (Mar. 12, 2015), 
https://law.smu.edu.sg/sites/default/files/law/CEBCLA/Notes_Confidentiality_in_International_Arb
itration.pdf [https://perma.cc/FBR6-V45F].  
82. See supra text accompanying notes 31–32. 
83. 297 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2002). 
84. Id. at 548. 
85. 580 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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we   have   stated   more   broadly   that   a   person’s   desire   for  
confidentiality is not honored in litigation.86 
Perhaps all that can be said is that context matters. As noted above, in 
Baxter International, the case arose in part from the same arbitration that 
was apparently the source of the documents the parties sought to keep 
confidential. In Gotham Holdings, one of the parties, Health Grades, had 
introduced some of the documents from a previous arbitration to which 
it had been party but opposed the introduction of others, even though the 
other party to the arbitration was willing to produce them. Under these 
circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the court allowed discovery in 
Gotham and refused to seal the documents in Baxter. 
Beyond the federal courts in the U.S., the issue gets even less clear.87 
Some U.S. state laws purport to impose absolute confidentiality on 
arbitration proceedings. An example (one that arguably conflicts with its 
“show  me  state”  nickname)  is  Missouri’s: 
Arbitration, conciliation and mediation proceedings shall be 
regarded as settlement negotiations. Any communication 
relating to the subject matter of such disputes made during the 
resolution process by any participant, mediator, conciliator, 
arbitrator or any other person present at the dispute resolution 
shall be a confidential communication. No admission, 
representation, statement or other confidential communication 
made in setting up or conducting such proceedings not otherwise 
discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or 
subject to discovery.88 
However, the extent to which this or other similar provisions will be 
enforced by courts is unclear.89 Moreover, as with Rule 408, it is 
possible that the provision could be interpreted, particularly in its 
reference to settlement negotiations and mediation, to apply only to 
admissibility in the same case if the alternative methods fail. 
The same lack of clarity exists outside the United States. A 2005 
English decision, Glidepath BV v. Thompson,90 sets out a position very 
protective of confidentiality: 
                                                     
86. Id. at 665.  
87. A brief outline of the law in other countries can be found in Sarles, supra note 30, at 3–7. 
88. MO. REV. STAT. § 435.014(2) (2016). 
89. Samuel Estreicher & Steven C. Bennett, The Confidentiality of Arbitration Proceedings, N.Y. 
L.J. (Aug. 13, 2008). 
90. [2005] EWHC 818 (Comm) (citation to Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir, [1999] 1 WLR 
314, omitted). 
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There can be no doubt that arbitration proceedings and materials 
produced in the course of them are treated as confidential to the 
parties and the arbitrator subject to certain exceptions. The result 
of the most recent Court of Appeal authority, is that the 
exceptions to the general rule of arbitral confidentiality include 
disclosure by leave or order of the court which may be given 
when and to the extent that it is reasonably necessary to protect 
or establish the legal rights of a party to the arbitration by a third 
party or otherwise in the interests of justice. There appears to be 
no authority for the proposition that a third party can outside the 
ambit of disclosure by a party to an arbitration obtain an order 
from the court for access to materials in an arbitration to which 
he is not a party so that he can deploy them as evidence in other 
proceedings in which he is a party.91 
But the law in the U.K. is not as clear as this passage would suggest. 
In Ali Shipping Corp. v. Shipyard Trogir,92 the Court of Appeals 
discussed  several  possible  “exceptions”  to  confidentiality,  including  the  
“public  interest,”  and  acknowledged  that  the  scope  of  those  exceptions  is  
not clear and must be resolved in future decisions.93 The law on this 
issue in other countries is also unclear. Recent commentary on 
confidentiality in arbitration discusses cases from a variety of 
jurisdictions   and   ultimately   is   able   only   to   provide   “tentative  
observations.”94 Among the factors that are important are not only the 
jurisdiction at issue but also whether it is the award or other documents 
that are sought to be disclosed,95 the context more generally, and the 
scope  of  the  “public  interest”  exception.96 
2. Disclosure in Arbitration 
It is even less clear whether a confidentiality agreement will be 
honored in arbitration.97 An arbitral tribunal generally has no power to 
                                                     
91. Id. ¶ 15. 
92. [1999] 1 WLR 314. 
93. Id. at 326–28. 
94. NOUSSIA, supra note 77, at 106.  
95. Id. at 107–21. 
96. Id. at 103–06. 
97. See generally Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo & Flavio Ponzano, Confidentiality Within 
Arbitration, in CONFIDENTIAL AND RESTRICTED ACCESS INFORMATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION (ASA Special Series No. 43) (Elliott Geisinger ed., 2016) (noting, among other 
difficulties, that the law applicable to different items of information might differ depending on the 
origin of that information). 
Patterson – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:40 PM 
2018] CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 849 
 
enforce discovery orders. So, if a patentee arbitrated or otherwise settled 
a royalty dispute with licensee A with a confidentiality agreement and 
then subsequently agreed to an arbitration with alleged 
infringer/potential licensee B, the royalty that resulted from the first 
arrangement with licensee A might not be available in the second. Of 
course, B might refuse to agree to arbitration without the availability of 
the materials from the prior arbitration, but the patentee might not be 
able to disclose those materials unilaterally, without the consent of A, 
and perhaps also the consent of the prior arbitral tribunal. 
This  is  so  despite  the  Federal  Arbitration  Act’s  grant  to  arbitrators  of  
the  power  to  “summon  in  writing  any  person  to  attend  before  them . . . as 
a witness and in a proper case to bring with him . . . any book, record, 
document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the 
case.”98 First, this section has been held by a majority of circuits 
considering it to apply in the actual arbitral hearing.99 More importantly, 
it is unclear, just as it is in litigation, whether an arbitral tribunal would 
order disclosure of licenses or prior arbitral awards subject to 
confidentiality agreements, or even to confidentiality orders of courts or 
arbitral tribunals. 
The  International  Bar  Association’s  Rules  on  the  Taking  of  Evidence  
in International Commercial Arbitration address confidentiality, but not 
in a particularly helpful way. The rules provide that parties can request 
production   of   documents,   but   that   the   tribunal   “shall . . . exclude from 
evidence   or   production   any   document”   on   “grounds   of   commercial   or 
technical confidentiality that the Arbitral Tribunal determines to be 
compelling.”100 There appears to be little commentary on this issue, with 
most discussion of confidentiality in arbitration addressing how to 
maintain the confidentiality of arbitrations in later court proceedings, not 
in later arbitrations. 
3. Voluntary Disclosure 
Of course, all of these difficulties could be avoided if the party in 
control of information were willing and able to disclose it voluntarily. 
But that would be a breach of the confidentiality agreement unless that 
agreement provided for disclosure. Such provisions are possible, as this 
agreement shows: 
                                                     
98. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2012). 
99. See CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing cases). 
100. INT’L BAR ASS’N, Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration, 
art. 9.2(e) (1999). 
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Each Party and their [sic] attorneys agree that the terms of this 
Agreement shall be kept and maintained as confidential, and 
they shall not disclose the terms to any person . . . , unless 
disclosure is required by law, regulation, governmental 
authority, or by a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . Hygia may 
disclose the terms of this Agreement to any potential third party 
purchaser  of  Hygia   (and  such   third  party’s  attorneys,  principal,  
accountants and financial advisors), and Masimo may disclose 
the principal terms of this Agreement to any third party with 
whom it may have a dispute similar to the dispute at issue in the 
Lawsuit, provided that the third party agrees, in writing, to 
maintain in confidence any information relating to the 
Agreement that is disclosed by Masimo. Hygia and Masimo 
acknowledge and recognize that this covenant of confidentiality 
is a material and significant provision of this Agreement.101 
This provision gives the patentee, but apparently not the licensee, the 
right   to   disclose   the   agreement’s   terms.   It   thus   illustrates   that   the  
interests of the parties to a license or settlement may differ with respect 
to confidentiality.   As   one   commentator   says,   often   “patentees   do   not  
want the license terms to serve as precedent in other assertions of the 
patent(s).”102 But that is exactly the point, particularly in the FRAND 
context: to the extent that terms differ among licensees, there are 
competitive implications of the differences. 
C. The Costs of Confidentiality 
Despite the uncertainties discussed above, it certainly can be said that 
a confidentiality agreement in any of the above contexts will sometimes 
make access to the results of the dispute resolution less accessible. Even 
if those results would be disclosed in litigation or arbitration, requiring a 
party to initiate litigation or arbitration in order to gain access to 
information is a significant obstacle. As described above, the law of 
disclosure is unclear enough so that bringing a subsequent action might 
not produce a disclosure order. It is not even clear that, say, a potential 
licensee   seeking  access   to  a  patentee’s  previous   licenses  would  have   a  
cause of action with which to initiate a suit.103 The contrast between 
                                                     
101. Exhibit No. 10-1 to Form 8-K, Masimo Corp. (July 19, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/937556/000119312510163361/dex101.htm [https://perma.cc/8897-NAFY]. 
102. Amend, supra note 58. 
103. In the FRAND context, a potential licensee could perhaps bring an action for breach of the 
patentee’s   FRAND   obligation,   or   even   for   declaratory   judgment   of   reasonable   royalty   rates.   See 
Realtek Semiconductor, Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-3451-RMW, 2014 WL 2738226, *4–6 (N.D. 
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these circumstances and reliance on public court decisions is dramatic, 
with court decisions generally available to the public at little or no cost. 
Furthermore, a court or arbitral order to disclose previous royalty 
terms will typically not make those terms available to other market 
participants because tribunals will often issue protective orders and 
redact license information in their opinions.104 A telling recent 
illustration of this point comes from Germany. The usual rule in 
Germany is that parties and intervenors, and not only their attorneys, are 
entitled to access to documents filed in litigation.105 Despite this 
background rule, the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf deviated from 
it in approving a non-disclosure agreement that allowed access only to 
four employees of the defendant, all of whom were required to maintain 
confidentiality, and only to the attorneys for an intervenor.106 Thus, even 
where disclosure would otherwise have been mandated, the use of the 
disclosed information was limited to that case. 
One might argue that there should be no expectation of disclosure 
outside of litigation. After all, even absent obligations of confidentiality, 
one or both parties in a license negotiation might decline to disclose the 
terms of prior licenses, settlements, or arbitrations. For arbitration, 
though, the correct baseline is not whether the parties would have chosen 
to disclose the information even without a confidentiality agreement but 
whether the information would have become public in litigation. 
                                                     
Cal. June 16, 2014); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823 JLR, 2011 WL 11480223, *2 
(W.D. Wash. June 1, 2011). Although in the absence of an infringement suit it is not clear whether 
such a claim would be ripe, one court can be read to suggest that it would. In Microsoft Corp. v. 
Motorola, Inc.,  a  FRAND  dispute,  the  court  wrote  that  “[a]ll  that  is  required for a claim to be ripe is 
‘a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy 
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.’”  2011  WL  11480223,  at  *3  (citing  
Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 668 (9th Cir. 2005)). Although the patentee in 
that case had previously filed infringement actions, the court did not appear to rely on that fact. 
104. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at ¶¶ 407–54, Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., No. 10-cv-1823 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (redactions), http://www.essentialpatentblog. 
com/wp-content/uploads/sites/64/2013/04/2013.04.25-D.E.-681-Findings-of-Fact-and-Conclusions-
of-Law-setting-RAND-royalty1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ9X-GMVV]; Contreras & Newman, supra 
note 19,  at  40  n.22  (“[E]ven  in  this  case,  the  details  of  certain  private  license  agreements  disclosed  
to the court and which factored into his analysis were redacted from the public versions of the 
opinion.”);;  Perkins,  supra note 30.  
105. Annsley Merelle Ward, Is  German  SEP  Litigation  Set  to  Increase  with  the  ‘Confidentiality  
Club   Decision’   of   the   Higher   Regional   Court   of   Düsseldorf?, IPKAT (Feb. 7, 2017), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2017/02/german-court-prowls-into-realm-of.html [http://perma.cc/ 
S7EK-PN8N]. In the U.S., protective orders often limit disclosure of confidential information to 
attorneys.  
106. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Jan. 17, 2016, I-2 U 31/16, 
English translation at https://www.katheraugenstein.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/2017-01-17-
Confidentiality-Order.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKK3-C9L4]. 
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Arbitration is of course an alternative to litigation. The advantages of 
arbitration may support allowing the parties to opt for it in lieu of 
litigation, but as described above arbitration does not necessarily require 
confidentiality. At the least, the benefits of confidentiality should be 
balanced against its harms. 
Furthermore, a dispute in arbitration is one in which the parties have 
not been able to reach agreement. As a result, the arbitration award is the 
reasoned conclusion of a disinterested third party, the tribunal, in the 
same way that a court decision is. For that reason, a decision reached in 
arbitration is arguably more valuable than private negotiations, which 
might be more the product of the bargaining power of the parties. One 
could argue that the harm from suppressing information about purely 
private agreements is not great, given that the information might reflect 
the particular characteristics of the parties rather than a more objective 
measure. Allowing the parties to suppress information produced by a 
third party, however, is more problematic. These issues are discussed 
further in the context of the competitive effects of confidentiality. 
As will be discussed below, the key antitrust question is whether 
raising the costs of obtaining information about patent validity and 
royalty rates can provide a competitive advantage. To the extent that 
such information is difficult or costly to obtain, it can give the patentee 
or a licensee a competitive advantage that can be the source of market 
power. In that respect, the question is not a binary one of whether the 
information is or is not available but instead a question of the cost of 
obtaining it. Thus the important point is less whether arbitration 
materials, settlements, or licenses are available, sometimes and to some 
degree, in subsequent proceedings, and more whether access to such 
materials is important enough and costly enough to make confidentiality 
a source of competitive harm. 
II. PATENT DISPUTES AND SUPPRESSION OF INFORMATION 
Information is important both in patent law and in antitrust. In each 
body  of  law,  the  courts  have  limited  private  parties’  abilities  to  suppress  
information. The first section below discusses the way in which patent 
law has done so, focusing primarily on information regarding patent 
validity but also drawing comparisons to royalty information.107 The 
                                                     
107. Although much of the focus in this area has been on validity determinations, royalty rates 
are also often the subject of litigation. The determination of FRAND royalty rates has in fact been 
the subject of several recent and important court decisions. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent 
Litig., MDL No. 2303, No. 11-C-9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013); Microsoft Corp. 
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second   section   then   discusses   antitrust   law’s   condemnation   of  
agreements not to disclose both price and non-price information. The 
third section describes how antitrust law has also found violations in the 
extrajudicial resolution of patent disputes. The fourth section then builds 
on the first three to argue that the importance of patent royalty 
information is such that confidentiality in patent dispute resolution can 
be contrary to both bodies of law. 
A. The Importance of Patent Information 
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed the value of patent 
litigation, making clear that its value lies not only in the resolution of the 
dispute for the parties, but also in maintaining the proper functioning of 
the patent system. In Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,108 the Court invalidated the 
doctrine of licensee estoppel, under which the licensee of a patent was 
estopped   from   challenging   the   patent’s   validity. The Court pointed 
specifically to the important public policy and competition issues at 
stake: 
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily 
when they are balanced against the important public interest in 
permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are 
in reality a part of the public domain. Licensees may often be 
the only individuals with enough economic incentive to 
challenge  the  patentability  of  an  inventor’s  discovery.  If  they  are  
muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to 
would-be monopolists without need or justification. We think it 
plain that the technical requirements of contract doctrine must 
give way before the demands of the public interest in the typical 
situation involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has 
issued.109 
The Court extended this approach in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, 
Inc.,110 holding that even a current licensee could challenge patent 
validity while continuing to pay royalties under the license, thus 
avoiding  the  possibility  of  paying  enhanced  damages  and  attorney’s  fees  
if it lost.111 
                                                     
v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013); Unwired 
Planet  Int’l  Ltd.  v.  Huawei  Tech.  Co.  [2017]  EWHC  (Pat)  711. 
108. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
109. Id. at 670–71. 
110. 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
111. Id. at 122, 134, 137. 
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The problematic nature of confidentiality in patent disputes can be 
illustrated, too, by the practices of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office’s   Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).112 The PTAB is a 
review board that considers primarily validity challenges. Parties may 
choose to settle their disputes before the PTAB, but the PTAB does not 
always terminate its proceedings when the parties do so.113 And 
regardless of whether the proceeding is terminated after settlement, the 
parties must file a copy of the settlement with the PTAB and must make 
a particular request to keep it confidential.114 If such a request is made, 
the  settlement  is  available  only  to  a  government  agency  or  to  “any  other 
person upon written request to the Board to make the settlement 
agreement available, . . . and  on  a  showing  of  good  cause.”115 
Although these decisions focused on patent validity, the difference 
between validity information and royalty information is one more of 
degree than of kind, as suggested above. Many patent disputes, including 
most SEP disputes, involve the licensing of large portfolios of many 
patents.116 In such circumstances, it is exceedingly unlikely that an 
alleged infringer could invalidate all of the patents in a portfolio. As a 
result, licensing is necessary. Indeed, because in a given portfolio it is 
almost certain that some patents will be valid and others will not, the 
royalty rate is in fact a reflection of or proxy for validity information.117 
The validity-royalty is especially compelling in the SEP/FRAND 
context. Although validity challenges are still possible in that context, 
the adoption of a patent in a standard is probably at least some indication 
of   validity.   More   importantly,   FRAND’s requirement of non-
discriminatory (ND) licensing makes license terms essential information. 
That is, just as patent validity is essential information for potential 
                                                     
112. See generally Anthony A. Hartmann, Protecting Confidential Information Before the Patent 
Trial and Appeal Board, FINNEGAN: OUR INSIGHTS (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.finnegan.com/ 
resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=a5395b90-a3db-42f2-b855-e9ed6958d1b2 
[http://perma.cc/G99K-VHGS].  
113. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.74(a) (2016); Stephen Kenny, FOLEY HOAG LLP, When Joint Settlement 
Agreements Do Not Settle, PTAB BLOG (Oct. 30, 2015), http://www.ptab-blog.com/2015/10/20/ 
when-joint-settlement-agreements-do-not-settle/ [http://perma.cc/862F-HWDJ].  
114. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.74(b), (c). 
115. Id.; Hartmann, supra note 112. 
116. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1. 
117. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1; Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 1; cf. FTC v. 
Actavis Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013)  (“In  a  word,  the  size  of  the  unexplained  reverse  payment  can  
provide   a   workable   surrogate   for   a   patent’s   weakness,   all   without   forcing   a   court   to   conduct   a  
detailed  exploration  of  the  validity  of  the  patent  itself.”). 
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licensees in archetypical licensing contexts, so is royalty-rate 
information for potential licensees of SEPs. 
Indeed, the prevalence of arbitration might make royalty information 
even more important to competition than is validity information. 
Although U.S. patent law provides for arbitration of validity,118 many 
other jurisdictions do not because it is viewed as implicating a public 
interest.119 Hence, confidential validity determinations are likely to be 
less common than confidential royalty determinations. In fact, this may 
be why the implications of the confidentiality of arbitrations for 
competition and antitrust have not often been at issue. Moreover, if an 
arbitral tribunal invalidates a patent, but that information is not available 
to the public, the patent may continue to be enforced, just as it would if 
the dispute were settled.120 U.S. patent law,   in   fact,   states   that   “[a]n  
award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to 
the  arbitration  but  shall  have  no  force  or  effect  on  any  other  person.”121 
Hence, this sort of validity determination might better be seen as 
analogous merely to a private agreement by the patentee not to enforce 
the patent against that particular alleged infringer.122 
Furthermore,  if  a  patent  is  invalidated,  the  prevailing  “infringer”  will  
be free to practice the invention without paying any royalty fees, 
regardless of whether information about the invalidity becomes public. 
The result can be a dramatic drop in prevailing prices,123 from which 
                                                     
118. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (2012). 
119. Thomas H. Lee, International Arbitration of Patent Claims, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2015 (Arthur W. Rovine 
ed., 2016); Smith et al., supra note 31, at 305. 
120. See Smith et al., supra note 31,  at  305  (“The  effect  of  the  award,  however,  generally  remains  
inter partes. Thus, an arbitral tribunal award finding a patent invalid generally will not preclude the 
enforcement  of  that  patent  against  nonparties  to  the  arbitration.”). 
121. 35 U.S.C. § 294(c). It is possible, however, that enforcement against other infringers would 
be an antitrust violation under the Walker Process doctrine. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food 
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965). The doctrine is generally viewed as applicable to 
invalidations by a court, though, and it is not clear how a court considering a Walker Process claim 
would view an effort to enforce a patent invalidated by an arbitration tribunal. 
122. One author has taken a similar position: 
This point of view argues that because arbitration is a consensual process, the effect of it 
should be confined to the parties participating in the arbitration voluntarily. Thus, it is 
impossible for the arbitration tribunals to render an award invalidating a patent because the 
award would affect the public—an involuntary party. Because an arbitral award is only a 
private affair, it cannot bind the third party and any arbitral award attempting to invalidate a 
patent  would  exceed  the  arbitrator’s  powers. 
Wu, supra note 44, at 392–93 (citations omitted). 
123. This effect may differ by market, however, and by the number of entrants. For example, 
some evidence suggests that in the pharmaceutical market, one generic entrant will not always lower 
prices significantly. One FDA analysis shows a price charged by the first generic entrant that is 
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potential competitors could perhaps infer the invalidity result.124 A 
determination of royalties is different, because the   licensee’s   required  
royalty payment may prevent prices from dropping significantly. As a 
result, potential competitors may have trouble drawing any inferences 
about the royalty rate being paid, given the likely differences in other 
costs among potential   licensees.   It   has   even   been   argued   that   “it   is  
difficult to see why an accused infringer would have the complete 
invalidation  of  the  patent  as  one  of  its  litigation  objectives.”125 
In the FRAND context, where manufacturers generally practice 
hundreds or thousands of patented inventions, it is even more difficult to 
draw any conclusions about particular royalty rates paid by competitors. 
A manufacturer that sees a higher or lower price charged by a competitor 
will not be able to tell whether that competitor is paying higher or lower 
royalty rates, has licenses for more or fewer of the essential patents, or 
instead simply has different costs. Moreover, in that context, with many 
patented inventions, the overall cost of ascertaining the aggregate royalty 
burden would be prohibitive. Hence the cost of being denied low-cost 
access to royalty information is even more important in the aggregate 
than it is for individual patents or patent portfolios. 
Moreover, it could be argued that the FRAND context and the 
obligation of non-discriminatory licensing raise the level of importance 
of royalty information. As will be discussed below,126 courts have 
recognized the importance of information in the FRAND context, and it 
is difficult to see how compliance with the non-discrimination 
                                                     
almost the same as that for the brand-name drug, but a price for generics that is almost 50% less 
than the brand-name price after two entrants. See Generic Competition and Drug Prices, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/centersoffices/officeofmedicalproductsandtobacco/ 
cder/ucm129385.htm [http://perma.cc/XK2T-APQC]. Of course, generic drugs lack the trademark 
of brand-name drugs, so competition is imperfect; in other markets, the effect would presumably be 
greater.  
124. The same inference could be drawn if, as would presumably be the case, the patentee ceased 
seeking to enforce the now-declared-invalid patent. The Walker Process doctrine in the U.S. makes 
it an antitrust violation to enforce an invalid patent, and although it is not entirely clear whether this 
would apply to a patent invalidated in an arbitration proceeding, a patentee would be taking a 
considerable risk in seeking to enforce the patent against other infringers. See supra note 121. 
Although a FRAND obligation could create an analogous, if weaker, constraint on patentees, it is 
not  clear   that  potential   licensees  would  be  able   to  assess  whether  a  patentee’s  conduct  was  being  
constrained by a FRAND obligation. 
125. Smith et al., supra note 31,  at  312.  The  authors  note  that  “[t]he  alleged  infringer  is  likely to 
prefer a broad and irrevocable patent license, leaving the monopoly intact for non-party competitors, 
and  leaving  the  enforcement  costs  with  the  patentee.”  Id. 
126. See infra text accompanying notes 192–200. 
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requirement could be determined without access to license terms.127 In 
that respect, although information about patents and royalty rates is 
always important, the obligation of FRAND licensing makes it essential. 
B. Agreements to Suppress Information Under Antitrust Law 
The U.S. Supreme Court has condemned restrictions on both price 
and non-price information that could be seen as analogous to royalty 
rates. In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,128 
the Court addressed a professional   engineering   society’s   ban   on  
competitive bidding. The ban required engineers to refuse to discuss 
prices with potential customers until the customers had made an initial 
selection of an engineer.129 The effect, then, was to make it more 
difficult for customers to compare the prices offered by different 
engineers,130 just as confidential royalty agreements make it difficult for 
potential licensees to assess offers by patentees. 
Confidential resolutions of royalty disputes are different in that they 
deny potential licensees the prices paid by their competitors, rather than 
denying a potential customer price quotes from multiple sellers. 
Nevertheless,  the  Court’s  language  in  Professional Engineers regarding 
the importance of market information was broad: 
Price   is   the   “central   nervous   system   of   the   economy,”   and   an  
agreement   that   “interfere[s]   with   the   setting   of   price   by   free  
market   forces”   is   illegal   on   its   face.   In   this   case,   we   are  
presented with an agreement among competitors to refuse to 
discuss prices with potential customers until after negotiations 
have resulted in the initial selection of an engineer. While this is 
not price-fixing as such, no elaborate industry analysis is 
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an 
agreement. It operates as an absolute ban on competitive 
bidding, applying with equal force to both complicated and 
simple projects and to both inexperienced and sophisticated 
customers. As the District Court found, the   ban   “impedes   the  
ordinary   give   and   take   of   the  market   place,”   and   substantially  
deprives   the   customer   of   “the   ability   to   utilize   and   compare  
prices   in   selecting   engineering   services.”   On   its   face,   this  
                                                     
127. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 19, at 39–41; Kim, supra note 19, at 23–26; Lemley 
& Shapiro, A Simple Approach, supra note 19, at 1145–46. 
128. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
129. Id. at 683–84. 
130. Id. at 692–93. 
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agreement restrains trade within the meaning of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act.131 
The  confidentiality  of  royalty  rates  similarly  “impedes  the  ordinary  give  
and   take   of   the  market   place”   and   “the   ability   to   utilize   and   compare  
prices.” 
The Supreme Court took a similar approach to non-price information 
in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.132 In that case, an organization 
of dentists agreed not to provide x-ray information to insurers reviewing 
the services provided by the dentists.133 The dentists argued that the FTC 
had shown no injury in the market for dental services.134 As in 
Professional Engineers, though, the Court took a more summary 
approach, stating that no such showing was necessary because a showing 
of harm in the information market was sufficient: 
A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more 
costly) information desired by consumers for the purpose of 
determining whether a particular purchase is cost justified is 
likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the price-
setting mechanism of the market that it may be condemned even 
absent proof that it resulted in higher prices or, as here, the 
purchase of higher priced services, than would occur in its 
absence.135 
There is a recent parallel from the EU courts. In F. Hoffmann-La 
Roche Ltd. v. AGCM,136 Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe wrote 
that when parties had agreed to disseminate misleading information, 
there was a restriction by object under Article 101 TFEU: 
To my mind, the concerted communication of misleading 
allegations of the lesser safety of one medicinal product 
compared to another is, by its very nature, harmful to the proper 
functioning of the normal competition, so much so that an 
examination of its effects on competition is not necessary.137 
                                                     
131. Id. (citations omitted). 
132. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
133. Id. at 450–51. 
134. Id. at 461. 
135. Id. at 461–62. 
136. Opinion of Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe, Case C-179/16, F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM), 2018 E.C.R., http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62016CC0179 [https://perma.cc/2T6F-
4RGE]. 
137. Id. ¶ 156. 
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The  CJEU’s   judgment138 was not quite so explicit, but it also made 
clear that the informational agreement   “must   be   regarded   as   being  
sufficiently harmful to competition to render an examination of its 
effects  superfluous”:139 
[I]t must be held that the information whose notification to the 
EMA   and   the   general   public,   according   to   the   AGCM’s  
decision, was the subject of a cartel agreement between Roche 
and Novartis, are, failing compliance with the requirements of 
completeness and accuracy laid down in [relevant 
pharmaceutical regulations], to be regarded as misleading if the 
purpose of that information, which is a matter for the referring 
court to determine, was (i) to confuse the EMA [European 
Medicines Agency] and the Commission and have the adverse 
reactions mentioned in the summary of product characteristics 
so as to enable the MA [marketing authorization] holder to 
launch a communication campaign aimed at healthcare 
professionals, patients and other persons concerned with a view 
to exaggerating that perception artificially, and (ii) to emphasise, 
in a context of scientific uncertainty, the public perception of the 
risks associated with the off-label use of Avastin, given, inter 
alia, the fact that the EMA and the Commission did not amend 
the summary of characteristics of that product in respect of its 
“adverse reactions”   but merely issued “Special warnings and 
precautions for use”.140 
In both the U.S. and Europe, then, informational restraints are 
themselves sufficient for condemnation in some circumstances, even 
where the information at issue is market information about another 
product. To be sure, the agreeing parties in the cases just discussed were 
horizontal competitors. That is also the case for many patentees and 
licensees, however, and even where a patentee and licensee do not 
compete in a product market, they can be seen as competitors in the 
market for licensing information, as will be discussed below.141 
                                                     
138. Case C-179/16, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato (AGCM), 2018 E.C.R., http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62 
016CJ0179 [https://perma.cc/TZE4-Z5GK]. 
139. Id. ¶ 94. 
140. Id. ¶ 92. 
141. See infra text accompanying note 183. 
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C. Actavis and Information Suppression 
The anticompetitive potential of confidential patent information can 
be further illustrated by noting parallels between the reverse-payment 
settlements that the Supreme Court considered in FTC v. Actavis, Inc.142 
and confidential resolutions of patent disputes. As compared to 
litigation, both prevent patent information from reaching the public, or at 
least raise the costs of acquiring such information. Reverse-payment 
settlements do so when the parties agree to avoid the litigation arguably 
contemplated by the Hatch-Waxman Act,143 and confidential 
arbitrations, settlements, and licenses do so by replacing public litigation 
with a process that the parties agree to keep confidential. 
Moreover, in both instances there are federal statutes requiring 
disclosure of the information at issue, even if with arbitrations the statute 
is rarely complied with.144 The Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003145 introduced a 
requirement that parties settling patent infringement litigation brought 
pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act file copies of their agreements with 
the FTC and the Department of Justice.146 Similarly, as discussed 
above,147 U.S. patent law requires the public filing of patent arbitration 
awards. Both requirements recognize the importance of patent-related 
information, though the royalty information suppressed by confidential 
dispute resolution may be even more important than the validity 
information that would be disclosed by Hatch-Waxman litigation. 
The   Court’s   opinion   in   Actavis is focused primarily on the 
suppression of competition in the pharmaceutical market covered by the 
patents at issue in settlements.148 But I have previously suggested 
another harm that reverse-payment settlements cause: that of suppressing 
                                                     
142. 570 U.S. 136 (2013). 
143. As the Supreme Court said, a claim by the generic drug manufacturer that the patent is 
invalid   or   not   infringed   “automatically counts as patent infringement . . . and   often   ‘means  
provoking  litigation.’”  Id. at 143 (citations omitted). 
144. See supra note 50.  
145. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
146. Id. § 1112, 117 Stat. at 2462–63. 
147. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. 
148. Even thorough discussions of the competitive implications of patent settlements that 
emphasize uncertainty do not necessarily take an informational approach. See, e.g., Hovenkamp et 
al., supra note 25 (focusing on the market for pharmaceutical products). 
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information about patent validity.149 And there is some language in 
Actavis that points in that direction: 
The patent here may or may not be valid, and may or may not be 
infringed. . . . And that exclusion may permit the patent owner to 
charge a higher-than-competitive price for the patented product. 
But an invalidated patent carries with it no such right. And even 
a valid patent confers no right to exclude products or processes 
that do not actually infringe. The paragraph IV litigation in this 
case   put   the   patent’s   validity   at   issue,   as   wells   as   its   actual  
preclusive   scope.   The   parties’   settlement   ended   that   litigation.  
The FTC alleges that in substance, the plaintiff agreed to pay the 
defendants many millions of dollars to stay out of its market, 
even though the defendants did not have any claim that the 
plaintiff was liable to them for damages.150 
The focus in this passage on uncertainty, and on the way the settlement 
maintains it, carries with it the implication that the problem is at bottom 
an informational one. 
Furthermore, Actavis cited   one   of   the   Court’s   prior   cases,   United 
States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,151 which produced an opinion that 
took a specifically informational approach. Singer involved agreements 
among several patentees of inventions related to sewing machines. The 
patentees agreed both to combine their patents and enforce them jointly 
to seek to exclude Japanese manufacturers from the U.S. market for their 
mutual benefit and not   to   seek   to   limit   the   protection   of   each   other’s  
patents. The Court focused on the former of these agreements, which it 
said  violated  the  Sherman  Act  because  “the  conspiracy  arises  implicitly  
from the course of dealing of the parties, here resulting in Singer’s  
obligation  to  enforce  the  patent  to  the  benefit  of  all  three  parties.”152 The 
Court’s   focus   there  was  on   the  product  market   for   the   sales  of   sewing  
machines. 
More  interesting  for  present  purposes,  though,  was  the  parties’  second  
agreement, not to challenge   each   other’s   patents.   That   agreement  
implicated not just the product market but the market for information 
relevant  to  the  parties’  patent  rights,  and  Justice  White’s  dissent  focused  
particularly on the information issue. He points out that the public 
interest is in granting only valid patents, so that a settlement that 
“prevent[s]   an   open   fight   over   validity”   can   subordinate   that   public  
                                                     
149. Patterson, supra note 1, at 495–503. 
150. FTC v. Actavis Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 137 (2013) (emphasis in original). 
151. 374 U.S. 174 (1963). 
152. Id. at 194. 
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interest   to   the   settling   parties’   private   interests.153 As a result, he says 
that suppressing prior art constitutes an antitrust violation: 
[C]ollusion among applicants to prevent prior art from coming 
to   or   being   drawn   to   the   Office’s   attention   is   an   inequitable  
imposition on the Office and on the public. In my view, such 
collusion to secure a monopoly grant runs afoul of the Sherman 
Act’s   prohibition   against   conspiracies   in   restraint   of   trade—if 
not bad per se, then such agreements are at least presumptively 
bad.154 
Although these informational issues underlay the Actavis decision 
too, the Court there returned to a focus on product markets. But it did 
address the implications of uncertainty on the antitrust assessment. 
Although competitive harm is caused by a reverse-payment settlement 
only if the patent is invalid (or not infringed), and its validity is 
unknown, the Court observed that the nature of the settlement could be 
an   indicator   of   patent   validity:   “the   size   of   the   unexplained   reverse  
payment  can  provide  a  workable   surrogate  for  a  patent’s  weakness,  all  
without forcing a court to conduct a detailed exploration of the validity 
of   the   patent   itself.”155 It therefore directed courts to use that 
consideration and others to evaluate the competitive impact of the 
settlement:   “the   likelihood   of   a   reverse   payment   bringing   about  
anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the 
payor’s   anticipated   future   litigation   costs,   its   independence   from   other  
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing  justification.”156 
In the same way, the circumstances surrounding an agreement to 
arbitrate  while  maintaining  the  proceeding’s  confidentiality  can  be  used  
to determine the competitive effects of such an agreement.157 If the case 
is one for determination of royalties, for example, the suppressed royalty 
rates themselves need not generally be known to assess the significance 
of their suppression. The potential competitive harm results not just from 
the missing information itself but from the nature of the market and the 
parties’  justifications  for  suppressing  the  royalty  rates,  and these market 
considerations implicate antitrust law, as is discussed in the next section. 
                                                     
153. Id. at 199 (White, J., concurring). 
154. Id. at 200 (White, J., concurring) (citations and footnote omitted). 
155. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158. 
156. Id. at 159. 
157. The general approach would be similar to that described by Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley 
for settlements of IP disputes in Hovenkamp et al., supra note 25, at 1738–65. 
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D. Royalty Information and Competition 
The preceding sections described the importance of information, and 
particularly patent information. For antitrust to be applicable, though, the 
harm caused by the suppression of royalty information must be harm to 
competition. Is there such harm if royalty information is made 
unavailable? Many seller-buyer transactions are non-public without 
posing competition problems, so this question really turns on whether 
patentee-licensee transactions are sufficiently different from typical sales 
so that a lack of information about them has greater competitive effects. 
At least in certain circumstances, it is likely it does. 
First, it matters that confidentiality agreements are often involved in 
the patent context. Not only does that bring into play section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, or Article 101 of the TFEU, as outlined above,158 but it 
also indicates that both parties have cooperated in the confidentiality or, 
more likely, that one party has found confidentiality important enough to 
bargain for.159 That is some indication that the information is of value. In 
the more typical seller-buyer context, where the terms of a transaction 
might not be publicized but also are not subject to confidentiality 
obligations, there is no such indication. 
Second, the existence of competitive effects will often depend on 
whether the licensee is an intermediate manufacturer or the ultimate 
buyer. In the latter case, as in the typical sale of a patented product to a 
consumer, the differential pricing that could result from a lack of 
transparency usually would not have any effect on competition, because 
consumers are not engaged in competition.160 Whether there would be 
injury to other patentees would depend on whether the patent faced 
competition from other products, as the mere fact that a technology is 
patented does not mean that it faces no competition.161 If the patented 
technology faced no, or little, competition, price-discrimination among 
its customers might extract more profits from them but would not be 
likely to injure competition further. On the other hand, if the technology 
did face competition, harm would be possible, but it is not likely that the 
patentee would have the power to price-discriminate at all. 
                                                     
158. See supra section II.B. 
159. The situation is somewhat more complicated when parties seek a court order of 
confidentiality, because in the U.S. state actions and private petitioning for state actions are not 
generally considered matters of antitrust law. 
160. Cf. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 329 (1979). 
161. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
09 - Patterson.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:40 PM 
864 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:827 
 
By contrast, when a patentee licenses its patent to intermediate 
downstream manufacturers, as in FRAND licensing, lack of access to 
royalty information is more likely to cause harm through differential 
pricing. In those circumstances, the downstream licensee that paid the 
higher price could be disadvantaged in its competition with other 
licensees. It could, however, be difficult to distinguish the effect of 
confidentiality from that of the differential pricing. That is, it is possible 
that even with full disclosure of licensing terms, the patentee could still 
employ differential pricing. Perhaps, for example, the pricing would be a 
result  of   the  parties’   relative  bargaining  power,  and  information  played  
only a small role. In this respect, the source of the confidentiality clause 
could be relevant. If it originated with the patentee, and if the royalty 
rate was high, it seems unlikely that it would be intended to harm 
competition at the licensee level. On the other hand, if a licensee 
prompted the clause, or if the patentee demanded it as a condition of a 
lower rate, then harm from the confidentiality itself seems more 
plausible. 
Third, the relative values of the patented technology at issue and the 
downstream innovation of the licensees are important. To the extent that 
licensee innovation is important relative to the patented technology, the 
potential harm to competition at the licensee level is greater. 
Consequently, the potential harm from confidentiality will also be 
greater. This too is particularly relevant in the FRAND context. Patented 
technologies may be essential to standards, and thus subject to FRAND 
obligations, without being in themselves very innovative, but innovative 
competition among standardized products—cellphones, for example—
may be intense. In such instances, the harm from differential royalty 
rates, and thus confidentiality, may be significant. 
Finally, the number of standard-essential patents in the FRAND 
context is also important. Not only does it mean that the aggregate 
royalty differences paid by licensees can be significant, but it also means 
that the informational burden of confidentiality is greater. As described 
above, SEPS are often licensed as portfolios of many patents. Therefore, 
a licensee, needing licenses to a large portfolio of SEPs, would find it 
prohibitively expensive to value a portfolio without information about 
the rates paid by other licensees. In other words, there is likely to be no 
alternative to information about portfolio license rates, an issue that is 
discussed further in the context of market power. 
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III. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF CONFIDENTIAL PATENT 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Arbitration and presumably other forms of confidential dispute 
resolution may be used specifically to obtain the competitive benefits of 
confidentiality: 
In license disputes, the licensee or licensor may not want 
competitors or other licensees to have access to royalty rates or 
other sensitive terms and conditions of the business relationship. 
While protective orders may be used to protect sensitive 
financial information in court, the very existence of a dispute 
can be kept secret in an arbitral setting by agreement of the 
parties.162 
This part of the Article discusses whether the use of confidentiality to 
achieve such competitive advantages could be an antitrust violation. 
As described above,163 both the United States Supreme Court, in 
Professional Engineers164 and Indiana Federation of Dentists,165 and the 
CJEU, in Hoffman-La Roche,166 have summarily condemned information 
restraints. More importantly for the form that antirust analysis of such 
agreements should take, these courts focused specifically on the market 
information restrained, rather than on the ultimate product markets. In 
the discussion below, then, the focus is on the effects in the market for 
royalty information, not the market for patent licensing. 
Despite the summary condemnations in the cases just discussed, 
though, it seems likely that if a court were to consider these agreements 
under antitrust law, it likely would apply the rule of reason.167 The rule 
                                                     
162. David A. Allgeyer, In Search of Lower Cost Resolution: Using Arbitration to Resolve Patent 
Disputes, 12 CONFLICT MGMT. 1, 10 (2007).  
163. See supra section II.B. 
164. Nat’l  Soc’y  of  Prof’l  Eng’rs  v.  United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
165. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n  of  Dentists,  476  U.S.  447  (1986). 
166. Case C-179/16, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del 
Mercato (AGCM), 2018 E.C.R. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid= 
198644&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1075349 
[https://perma.cc/TZE4-Z5GK]. 
167. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley argue that the rule of reason is likely to be inappropriate for 
evaluating  settlements  of  cases   in  which  “the  agreement   itself   looks   like  an  antitrust  violation  but  
the presence of IP rights  might  absolve  it.”  Hovenkamp  et  al.,  supra note 25, at 1724; see also Mark 
R. Patterson, When Is Property Intellectual: The Leveraging Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133 
(2000). That is true, but only if the settlement (or arbitration) actually resolves issues that implicate 
intellectual property protection, as in the cases they discuss. Because royalty information is not 
itself intellectual property, an agreement on confidentiality of such information does not implicate 
intellectual property rights (except perhaps trade secrets in the royalty rates, see infra text 
accompanying notes 214–22). Therefore, application of the rule of reason is appropriate. 
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of reason requires an assessment and balancing of anticompetitive and 
procompetitive effects, and usually (though not always) also involves an 
assessment of market power.168 Each of these three elements is discussed 
below. 
A. Market Power 
Although patents themselves do not necessarily provide market 
power,169 it is likely that a patent whose validity or royalty terms is 
arbitrated, or even one that results in a licensing agreement, does give 
the patentee and its licensees power. Even if arbitration is less costly 
than litigation, the cost of either process is sufficient to allow an 
inference that access to the patent is valuable.170 Licensing, too, is an 
indication that a patent is valuable, at least if the licensee pays royalties. 
But the focus here is on the effects of confidentiality, so it is the value 
of confidentiality, not the value of the patent, that is at issue. In other 
words, the patent could be very valuable, but if the confidentiality of the 
results of an arbitration or license related to that patent did not have 
competitive implications, then the confidentiality would not raise 
competitive concerns.171 It might be, for example, that if there had 
previously been nine public decisions determining that a patent was 
valid and establishing FRAND royalty rates, the confidentiality of a 
tenth proceeding determining royalty rates might be thought to have no 
competitive implications. 
Even under these circumstances, though, if the tenth proceeding 
resulted in a significantly lower rate for the licensee, then that would 
have market implications.172 Not only would the lack of access to the 
lower rate injure competitors paying a higher rate, so too would the lack 
                                                     
168. See Mark R. Patterson, The Role of Power in the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 429 
(2000). 
169. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
170. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ET. AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (online  3d  ed.  2016)  (“To  be  sure,  patents  
litigated in infringement suits are probably more valuable as a group than patents that are never 
litigated.”  (footnote  omitted)). 
171. Conversely, the patent might not be intrinsically valuable, yet information about it could still 
be important. Suppose, for example, that a patent declared essential to a standard were in fact 
invalid or not actually essential to practicing the standard. Until a declaration of invalidity or 
inessentiality, manufacturers of the standardized products might still take and pay for licenses to it, 
and information about the royalty rates paid would then be valuable. 
172. Of course, the likelihood of a FRAND royalty determination deviating significantly from 
previous determinations for the same patent portfolio presumably decreases as the number of 
previous determinations increases, but there is little empirical evidence on these issues. 
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of access to information about the lower rate. These two harms may 
seem one, but they are not. For example, if a competitor paying a higher 
rate had a license with a most-favored-nation clause, it would be the lack 
of information about lower rates offered to others, not those rates 
themselves, that would prevent it from using that clause to demand a 
lower rate. And even assuming that a competitor paying a higher rate 
could not negotiate to lower it, information that others are paying less 
would be valuable. The competitor might want, for example, to redirect 
its efforts to other markets in which it was not at a cost disadvantage. 
The  value  of   confidentiality   could   also  be   inferred   from   the  parties’  
actions. The economic literature suggests that cases that proceed to trial, 
and thus presumably those that are arbitrated, are the ones in which the 
result is more uncertain.173 Hence, the cases in which parties agree on a 
license agreement in the absence of formal dispute resolution are likely 
to be those for which results are more clear. For those cases, even if the 
license precludes, say, an invalidity decision or royalty determination, 
affected parties may well be able to assess with some confidence the 
value of the patent at issue. In contrast, when parties proceed to 
arbitration or litigation, there is likely more uncertainty—uncertainty 
that would be lessened with the disclosure that confidentiality prevents. 
The confidentiality of these outcomes would be especially important 
in the FRAND context because they could indicate that the licensing 
terms were not only anticompetitive but also discriminatory.174 
Disclosure of such terms would likely give rise to both contract and 
antitrust claims based on non-FRAND licensing by the licensees 
disadvantaged by higher rates. The prevention of disclosure, then, could 
be viewed as a way of maintaining the ability to price above cost that is 
market power.175 And because that power would itself arise from the 
lessening of competition among licensees, it would implicate antitrust 
law.176 
                                                     
173. The literature on this issue is surveyed in Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of 
Litigation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442–45 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998). 
174. On the relationship between these two characteristics, see supra notes 209–10. 
175. Cf. NYNEX   Corp.   v.   Discon,   Inc.,   525   U.S.   128,   136   (1998)   (describing   “a   deception  
worked upon the regulatory agency that prevented the agency from controlling New York 
Telephone’s  exercise  of  its  monopoly  power”). 
176. Id. (“[C]onsumer   injury   naturally   flowed   not   so  much   from  a   less   competitive  market   for  
removal services, as from the exercise of market power that is lawfully in the hands of a 
monopolist.”  (emphasis  in  original)).  In  the  patent-licensing context, in contrast, the harm would be 
from the less competitive market among licensees as a result of the differential licensing rates. 
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The confidentiality of royalty rates in this context is quite similar to 
restrictions on advertising. Advertising restrictions have long been 
known to result in higher prices.177 Although royalty rates are not 
“advertising,”   public   knowledge   of   such   rates   would   serve   the   same  
purpose as price advertising. Moreover, public royalty rates would not 
present any of the problems that can justify some limitations on 
advertising.178 Although the usual focus in discussion of advertising 
restrictions is on the anticompetitive effect of such restrictions, in the 
increase in price, that higher price is also evidence of the creation of 
market power.179 
As is often the case with information issues, it is difficult in this 
context to separate the power and conduct issues.180 One way to 
distinguish the two is to assess power based on the ease or difficulty of 
competitive responses.181 In the context of patent dispute resolution, 
power could be assessed by considering whether injured parties have a 
means of countering or otherwise responding to confidential arbitration 
awards, settlements, or licensing agreements. That is, would they have a 
way to obtain the confidential information or to eliminate the 
competitive harm that the lack of access causes? The only really 
plausible means of responding, it seems, would be the one discussed 
above: to bring litigation in which a court might order disclosure of the 
confidential information.182 Given the expense of such a course of 
action, to say nothing of the problems of bringing a claim whose validity 
                                                     
177. See, e.g., Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 
337, 340–45 (1972) (finding that prices for eyeglasses are higher in states that restrict eyeglass 
advertising). 
178. See Robert H. Lande & Howard P. Marvel, The Three Types of Collusion: Fixing Prices, 
Rivals, and Rules, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 941, 951–64. 
179. Stephen J. Farr, Carol Horton Tremblay & Victor J. Tremblay, The Welfare Effect of 
Advertising Restrictions in the U.S. Cigarette Industry, 18 REV. INDUS. ORG. 147,  148  (2001)  (“[I]f  
advertising provides information and encourages competition, an advertising ban would increase 
market   power.”);;   see also WILLIAM S. COMANOR & THOMAS A. WILSON, ADVERTISING AND 
MARKET POWER (1974); John R. Morris & James A. Langenfeld, Advertising Restrictions as Rent 
Increasing Costs (FTC, Working Paper 196, 1992). 
180. See MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY: GOOGLE, YELP, LIBOR, 
AND THE CONTROL OF INFORMATION 61–84 (2017). 
181. Id.  
182. The information is not otherwise easily available. Even studies of the effects of SEPs on the 
smartphone market, for example, may not include royalty information. See, FORDHAM L. SCH. CTR. 
ON L. & INFO. POLICY, The Impact of the Acquisition and Use of Patents in the Smartphone 
Industry, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (2012), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
competition/en/studies/clip_study.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9EQ-BJVW]. It is presumably difficult to 
assess the effects of SEPs without royalty information. 
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would depend on the very information that would be sought in the 
litigation, confidentiality in this context could provide significant power. 
B. Anticompetitive Effects 
Accepting   that   confidentiality   of   a   patentee’s   royalty   arrangements  
with some of its licensees has the potential to affect royalty rates with 
other licensees, there still remains the question of whether such effects 
are anticompetitive in the sense required by antitrust law. Vertical 
arrangements like those between patentees and licensees are often 
viewed favorably by antitrust law. Moreover, differences in royalty rates 
do not necessarily harm competition. Even in the FRAND context, 
where discriminatory royalty rates would violate FRAND policies, that 
violation would not in itself establish a violation of antitrust law. As the 
following paragraphs show, though, confidentiality is in fact 
anticompetitive in this context. 
The restrictions on information in Professional Engineers and Indiana 
Federation of Dentists were the products of horizontal agreements 
among competitors, not vertical agreements like those between patentees 
and potential licensees. Still, the effect of the horizontal agreements in 
those cases was to provide sellers with an information advantage over 
buyers, and that is the effect also of the confidentiality of a royalty 
award. Such confidentiality denies information to potential licensees 
who would otherwise learn of the terms to which the patentee has agreed 
with other licensees. But the patentee, of course, will know of the award, 
and thus will have an advantage in its greater knowledge of market 
conditions—the license terms. 
Furthermore, in many cases both the patentee and the licensee will be 
manufacturing competitors.183 This is particularly true in the FRAND 
context, where many manufacturers of the standardized goods—
smartphones, for example—are also patentees. In that case, an 
agreement between a patentee and licensee is vertical with respect to the 
patent but horizontal with respect to the standardized products 
themselves. Because it is in that latter market in which harm occurs, by 
creating differences in input costs between competitors, the effect of an 
agreement between two competitors is more akin to an information 
                                                     
183. Some of the most prominent smartphone patent disputes, such as the ones between Apple 
and Samsung and those between Huawei and ZTE, have involved manufacturing competitors. Other 
patentees in the market, such as Unwired Planet, are non-practicing entities, but even then it is 
possible that a settlement, at least, could be used by the licensee specifically to attain an advantage 
over its competitors. 
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boycott than to the price-fixing effect in Professional Engineers, but it is 
still a horizontal one. Indeed, as the only sources of information 
regarding a particular license are the patentee and licensee, they are 
horizontal competitors in the provision of that information, which makes 
the boycott characterization even more apt. 
Furthermore, in the FRAND context, the patentee has made a 
commitment to license. In other contexts, a patentee is not obligated to 
license its patents, at least in the U.S.184 If a patentee is entitled to refuse 
to license, i.e., if the refusal itself is not deemed to be anticompetitive, 
then one might argue that a confidential licensing or arbitration would 
also not likely be anticompetitive. In the FRAND context, however, not 
only has the patentee committed to license the patent, rather than keep 
the technology to itself, but it has also agreed to license it on fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms. The ND element of FRAND 
is intended to ensure that all licensees are on an even playing field with 
respect to license terms.185 Only then will the benefits of competition 
among the licensees be fully realized. 
This is not to say that royalty discrimination, even in the FRAND 
context, is inherently an antitrust violation. A recent U.S. case, TCL v. 
Ericsson,186 took the view that it was not. In that case, the court said that 
harm to a firm offered discriminatory rates is sufficient to violate the 
non-discrimination obligation, whether or not competition as a whole is 
injured.187 The court went further and wrote that  “[t]he  Sherman  Act  and  
its long history provide no guide to understanding  ETSI’s   [the  SSO’s]  
non discrimination   under   FRAND.”188 In the TCL court’s   view,   then,  
there can be a violation of a non-discrimination obligation without a 
violation of antitrust law. 
The UK decision in Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei 
Technologies Co.189 took a different view. In that case, the court 
distinguished  between  what  it  called  “general”  non-discrimination, under 
which rates would be based on the value of the portfolio licensed but 
could not be based on the identity or characteristics of the licensee, and 
“hard-edged”   non-discrimination, which apparently would allow a 
                                                     
184. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2012). 
185. The sense in which that is true is disputed, but the dispute is not relevant here. See 
discussion supra note 16. 
186. Memorandum  of  Findings  of  Fact  and  Conclusions  of  Law,  TCL  Commc’n  Tech.  Holdings,  
Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 NS(DFMx) (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). 
187. Id. at 91. 
188. Id.  
189. [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711. 
Patterson – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:40 PM 
2018] CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 871 
 
licensee that paid rates higher than those charged to another licensee to 
demand those lower rates.  Ultimately  the  court  concluded  that  the  “hard-
edged”   discrimination   would   apply,   if   at   all,   only   to   the   extent   that  
competition was harmed: 
I conclude that the true interpretation of the ETSI FRAND 
undertaking from the point of view of non-discrimination is that 
a benchmark FRAND rate should be derived which is applicable 
to all licensees seeking the same kind of licence. That is what I 
have called general non-discrimination. If, contrary to this view, 
the FRAND undertaking also includes a specific non-
discrimination obligation whereby a licensee has the right to 
demand the very same rate as has been granted to another 
licensee which is lower than the benchmark rate, then that 
obligation only applies if the difference would distort 
competition between the two licensees.190 
In the end, neither of these cases sets out rules for determining when 
FRAND discrimination is also, or is not, an antitrust violation. Hence, 
there is no reason to think that the antitrust rules governing restrictions 
on information that were described in the previous part of this article 
would not apply in the context. To the extent that parties—patentees and 
licensees—refuse to compete in the provision of information to 
consumers interested in acquiring that information—other potential 
licensees—they are refusing to compete, and that refusal has 
anticompetitive effect that would be legal only if balanced by 
procompetitive effects. 
To be sure, even a commitment to FRAND licensing is not (now191) 
expressly a commitment to transparent licensing. It would be possible 
for a patentee to license all its licensees on FRAND terms without 
revealing to any licensees the licensing terms applied to others, just as it 
would still be conceivable that all licensees would negotiate the same (or 
non-discriminatory) terms without those terms being publicly available. 
The likelihood of that happening is small, though. Moreover, under 
those circumstances it is not clear what reason the patentee would have 
for not disclosing its licensing terms. The nondisclosure would increase 
uncertainty and therefore likely also increase the costs of negotiation. 
These points are strengthened by the EU precedent for requiring 
disclosures in the FRAND context. In its recent decision in Huawei 
                                                     
190. [2017] EWHC 711, ¶ 503. 
191. See infra section IV.C. 
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Technologies Co. v. ZTE Corp.,192 the Court of Justice of the European 
Union said that the patentee of a SEP subject to a FRAND commitment 
cannot seek an injunction against an alleged infringer without first 
providing notice to the alleged infringer.193 More specifically, the 
patentee is obligated  “to   alert   the   alleged   infringer  of   the   infringement  
complained about by designating that SEP and specifying the way in 
which   it   has   been   infringed.”194 This disclosure, it should be noted, is 
required in negotiations, not simply in any subsequent litigation. 
On the other hand, the CJEU also seemed to accept that licensing 
agreements   could  be   confidential:   “in   the   absence  of   a  public   standard  
licensing agreement, and where licensing agreements already concluded 
with other competitors are not made public, the proprietor of the SEP is 
better placed to check whether its offer complies with the condition of 
non-discrimination   than   is   the   alleged   infringer.”195 Although at least 
one German court after Huawei v. ZTE has looked to comparable 
licenses to decide whether   a   patentee’s   offer   was   FRAND,   it   too  
apparently did not require that those licenses be disclosed during 
negotiations,196 though   the   patentee’s   terms   were   apparently   publicly  
available.197 A later decision by the Higher Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf, however, did effectively impose a requirement that the 
patentee disclose the terms of other licenses.198 A report on this case 
noted that the court justified this approach on the basis that the potential 
licensee will not generally have access to that information.199 
Although the CJEU in Huawei v. ZTE did not go that far, it did set out 
a requirement that seems to assume such disclosure. After the patentee 
provides   the  disclosure  described  above,  “it   is   for   the  alleged   infringer  
diligently to respond to that offer, in accordance with recognised 
commercial practices in the field and in good faith, a point which must 
                                                     
192. Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=fi
rst&part=1&cid=1089878 [https://perma.cc/3BXV-SQPV]. 
193. Id. ¶ 60. 
194. Id. ¶ 61. 
195. Id. ¶ 64. 
196. See Giuseppe Colangelo & Valerio Torti, Filling Huawei’s  Gaps:  The  Recent  German  Case  
Law on Standard Essential Patents, 38 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 538, 541 (2017) (discussing 
Saint  Lawrence  Commc’ns  v.  Vodafone,  LG,  Cases  4a  O  73/14 and 4a O 126/14 (Mar. 31, 2016)). 
197. See 4IP COUNCIL, Case Law Post CJEU Ruling Huawei v. ZTE: Saint Lawrence v. 
Vodafone, LG, Düsseldorf (Mar. 31, 2016), http://caselaw.4ipcouncil.com/german-court-
decisions/saint-lawrence-v-vodafone-lg-dusseldorf [https://perma.cc/7JQL-L2VT]. 
198. Ward, supra note 105. 
199. Id. 
Patterson – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:40 PM 
2018] CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 873 
 
be   established   on   the   basis   of   objective   factors.”200 Although this 
requirement does not make entirely clear that the response must be a 
FRAND counteroffer, the court does say that if the alleged infringer 
seeks to claim that the patentee has violated competition law, the alleged 
infringer  must  have  submitted  “a  specific  counter-offer that corresponds 
to   FRAND   terms.”201 These   references   to   “objective   factors”   and   to 
“FRAND  terms”  seem  to  imply  that  the  alleged  infringer  has  knowledge  
of other licenses.202 
One could view the effects of the negotiating disadvantage that 
Huawei v. ZTE recognized as deriving from several possible sources. 
One possibility is that the sources of anticompetitive effects could be 
particular agreements to keep arbitrations or licenses confidential. 
Alternatively, those effects could also be said to derive from the 
agreements by SSOs to require FRAND licensing without requiring 
means for licensees to assess whether a licensing offer is in fact 
FRAND. That would make the scenario akin to those in which courts 
have found SSOs liable for allowing members to exploit their processes. 
For example, in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. 
Hydrolevel Corp.,203 the United States Supreme Court held that an SSO 
could be liable for not preventing a member from manipulating its 
procedures   and   exploiting   the   organization’s   reputation   to   injure   a  
competitor. The present context is different because confidentiality does 
not really exploit the standard-setting   process   or   the   SSO’s   reputation  
but instead uses a poorly (or incompletely) designed standard to 
advantage. That is, if FRAND requirements included not just a licensing 
standard but also a disclosure requirement, then confidentiality could not 
be used to avoid the FRAND requirement.204 If   an  SSO’s   rules  do  not  
include a disclosure requirement, though, the FRAND requirement is 
more easily avoidable simply by keeping previous licenses confidential. 
As I have argued elsewhere,205 the creation and administration of 
LIBOR by the British   Bankers’   Association   (BBA) led to similar 
problems, but in a pricing context. By defining LIBOR as an average of 
its  member  banks’  own  (private)  estimates  of  their  borrowing  costs, the 
                                                     
200. Huawei Techs. Co., Case C-170/13 ¶ 65.  
201. Id. ¶ 66. 
202. In this respect, a recent German court decision appears to require, as a condition of FRAND-
compliance, the disclosure of prior licensing agreements. See Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG] 
[Higher Regional Court] Jan. 17, 2016, I-15 U 66/15, ¶ 32; Ward, supra note 105. 
203. 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
204. See infra section IV.C. 
205. PATTERSON, supra note 180, at 91–94. 
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BBA provided no way for users of LIBOR to evaluate its accuracy.206 
Without   an   objective   measure   against   which   to   measure   the   banks’  
estimates or LIBOR itself, users were left merely to assume or hope it 
was accurate.207 The same is true for confidential FRAND licensing. If 
potential licensees have no reference point for FRAND, the agreement to 
impose FRAND obligations is one that remains easily exploitable by 
patentees. 
It  is  true  that  there  might  be  some  objective  measures  of  the  “fair”  and  
“reasonable”   aspects   of   FRAND.   Recent   cases   suggest,   though,   that  
FRAND estimates differ dramatically.208 If, and when, the law 
converges on a single rate or methodology for FRAND licensing, then 
perhaps it will be difficult for patentees to exploit the advantages that 
confidentiality provides them in the FRAND process. That is to say that 
if, and when, there are objective measures for FRAND beyond particular 
royalty negotiations, the confidentiality of such negotiations will not 
give patentees the market power to impose non-FRAND terms. At the 
limit, if only one FRAND rate or methodology is accepted,209 then 
discrimination would presumably be impossible. In the meantime, 
though, agreements on confidentiality can have anticompetitive effects. 
As a final point, many patent licenses, particularly of SEPs, are cross-
licenses. In that context, although there is often a balancing royalty 
payment that reflects the difference in the values of the two portfolios, 
there is no single royalty payment that reflects the value of either 
individual portfolio. It might be possible to argue, therefore, that 
confidentiality imposes no competitive harm, in that no useful 
information is suppressed. However, in such instances, the agreement to 
cross-license itself has an effect similar to confidentiality, in that it keeps 
valuable information from becoming publicly available. Therefore, that 
                                                     
206. Id. at 71–72. 
207. Id.  
208. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10–1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217, *65, 
*84, *101 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (deciding that the FRAND royalty rate for one of 
Motorola’s  FRAND portfolios was in a range between 0.555¢ and 16.389¢ per unit after Motorola 
contended it was entitled to between $3.00 and $4.50 per unit and Microsoft contended that 0.185¢ 
per unit was the proper rate), aff’d, 696 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2012). Generally speaking, the parties in 
the cases argue for dramatically different FRAND rates, even where courts conclude that their 
proposals are not inconsistent with their FRAND obligations. 
209. In Unwired Planet International Ltd. v. Huawei Technologies Co., [2017] EWHC (Pat) 711, 
a  recent  UK  case,  the  court  held  that  there  is  only  a  single  set  of  FRAND  terms  “in  a  given  set  of  
circumstances.”   Id. ¶ 164. This approach, however, poses some particular problems, and it is 
unclear whether other courts will follow it. See Mark R. Patterson, Prof. Patterson: Teasing 
Through a Single FRAND Rate, PATENTLY-O (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/04/patterson-teasing-through.html [https://perma.cc/3SLS-7CTT]. 
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agreement to cross-license, rather than to enter into two separate 
licenses, could itself be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
C. Procompetitive Effects 
In considering the possible procompetitive benefits of confidentiality, 
there are two types of effects that should be considered. One is the 
possible procompetitive benefit, in general, of suppression of 
information.210 Although this possibility may be less valid in the 
FRAND context, where there is a non-discrimination obligation, there 
are circumstances in which information could serve to lessen 
competition. The second derives from the possible implications of 
confidentiality for incentives to use dispute resolutions processes that 
may themselves have procompetitive benefits. Each of these effects is 
discussed below, both for private licensing negotiations and for 
arbitration. 
1. Benefits of Confidential Licensing 
Erik Hovenkamp and Jonathan Masur have argued that the use in 
patent  damages  calculations  of  a  “reasonable  royalty”  standard  based  on  
prior licenses can distort the licensing market.211 The reason for this 
distortion, they contend, is that parties, and particularly patentees, will 
alter their demands in licensing in order to gain later advantages in 
litigating with other licensees, where damages may be based on those 
licensing terms. This argument offers little support for confidentiality 
agreements, though, as distinguished from different damages rules, 
because even confidential license terms would almost certainly be 
disclosed in any litigation, whatever the damages rules. 
An analogous argument seems more reasonable in the FRAND 
context, however. To the extent that a license agreement for a FRAND-
encumbered patent to one licensee has implications for licenses to other, 
later licensees, the same sort of distortion could occur.212 Thus, 
confidentiality would seem to have benefits, to the extent that they could 
avoid these distortions. It is not clear, however, that these would be 
procompetitive benefits. In Professional Engineers, the Supreme Court 
rejected an argument that making price negotiations more costly was 
                                                     
210. A well-known work that suggests the possibility of such benefits is Oliver Hart & Jean 
Tirole, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, in BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 
205 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1990). 
211. Hovenkamp & Masur, supra note 79. 
212. See supra text accompanying notes 67–68 and infra text accompanying note 229. 
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procompetitive not because it did not have the effects the engineers 
claimed, but because those effects came from eliminating competition.213 
Similarly, one could say that using confidentiality to eliminate the 
distortion that price competition might in some instances produce in 
patent licensing could be beneficial, but it would not benefit competition. 
It does seem, though, that outside the FRAND context one could 
accept a somewhat similar argument that confidentiality with respect to 
one licensing negotiation might promote agreement because a 
confidential agreement will not have unanticipated effects in later 
negotiations. In this context, this is simply an argument that licensing 
terms are trade secrets that promote cooperative negotiations. For 
example, in his recent exploration of the application of antitrust law to 
trade secrets, Harry First wrote that a trade secret could sometimes be 
justified   “as   a   way   to   allow   innovators   to   share   their   technology   and  
thereby diffuse  innovation.”214 
Although this argument is less compelling in the FRAND context, at 
least one case has applied it in that context. In Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE 
Corp.,215 the parties had initiated negotiations toward a settlement of 
FRAND licensing terms. As part of those negotiations, the parties 
entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) that provided in part that 
information  exchanged  “shall  not  be  used  or   referenced in any way by 
any Party in any existing or future judicial or arbitration proceedings or 
made   the   subject   of   any   public   comment   or   press   release.”216 As the 
court described, the parties provided for the possibility that the 
information might be sought by others: 
In the event that one of the parties received a request for such 
information from a governmental entity or a third party, whether 
via a discovery request or a subpoena, the NDA provided that 
the   recipient   must   (i)   “maintain   the   confidentiality   of   the 
Confidential   Information;;”   (ii)   “timely   seek   a   protective  
order . . . that would afford the Confidential Information the 
highest  level  of  confidential  treatment  possible;;”  and  (iii)  “notify  
the other Party within three business days of receiving the initial 
request  for  Confidential  Information.”217 
                                                     
213. Nat’l  Soc’y  of  Prof’l  Eng’rs  v.  United  States,  435  U.S.  679,  696  (1978). 
214. Harry First, Trade Secrets and Antitrust Law, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE 
SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 332, 371 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & 
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011). 
215. No. 14-cv-4988 (LAK), 2015 WL 3498634 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015). 
216. Id. at *5. 
217. Id. at *2. 
Patterson – Ready to Pub (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2018  5:40 PM 
2018] CONFIDENTIALITY IN PATENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 877 
 
Despite the NDA, ZTE submitted a Vringo settlement proposal as 
part of an antitrust complaint in China.218 When Vringo learned of this 
use of the proposal, it brought a breach of contract action seeking a 
preliminary injunction requiring ZTE to withdraw any disclosures, and 
the court held that it was likely to succeed in showing a violation of the 
NDA.219 Strikingly, the court appeared to hold, or perhaps assume, that 
confidentiality was a benefit of the NDA: 
Public disclosure   of   Vringo’s   Confidential   Information   would  
cause   it   irreparable   injury.   Vringo’s   business   depends  
substantially on the value of its patent portfolio, which it 
licenses  to  third  parties.  The  disclosure  of  Vringo’s  Confidential  
Information, including   its   proposal   to   settle   years   of   ZTE’s  
alleged patent infringement, would impact the prices others 
would pay to obtain licenses as well as the prices its competitors 
would offer for their licenses. Indeed, once such commercially-
sensitive information becomes  public  knowledge,  it  can  “not  be  
made  secret  again.”   In  short,   the  disclosure  of   that   information  
would   have   a   lasting   and   immeasurable   harm   to   Vringo’s  
business.220 
It is not clear, however, whether ZTE raised competitive effects as an 
argument for the invalidity of the NDA. The key question, both for 
contractual validity of the NDA and for assessment of it under antitrust 
law, is whether any anticompetitive effects of the confidentiality 
outweigh the competitive benefits of confidentiality. That is, it might 
well be that it is valuable to Vringo to keep the information confidential 
(particularly because the information at issue was only a settlement 
proposal, not the terms to which the parties finally agreed), but if that 
value is achieved through anticompetitive effects, the law should not 
preserve it. 
As  Harry  First  describes,  “[t]here  has  been  little  separate  focus  on  the  
competition   problems   that   trade   secrets  may  present.”221 He ultimately 
concludes   that   “the   arguments   for   according   deference   to   the   use of 
confidential trade secret information are somewhat different, and far 
weaker, than the arguments for according such deference to the holders 
of   either   patents   or   copyrights.”222 In the FRAND context, where 
                                                     
218. Id. at *2–3. 
219. Id. at *6–9. 
220. Id. at *10. 
221. First, supra note 214, at 332. 
222. Id. at 333. 
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information is essential to determine compliance with FRAND licensing 
obligations, this conclusion seems even more reasonable. 
2. Benefits of Confidential Arbitration 
Neither of these justifications is compelling in the arbitration context. 
The determination of licensing terms by the arbitral body rather than by 
negotiation presumably eliminates the incentives effects and 
gamesmanship discussed by Hovenkamp and Masur. Furthermore, when 
the parties enter into arbitration, they have failed to agree on a license, 
so the rationale of encouraging negotiations does not exist. Moreover, in 
the FRAND context, the patentee has an obligation to license and the 
parties have turned to an impartial forum. Not only does that mean that 
the information is no longer confined to just the two parties (though of 
course a protective order could still preserve obligations of 
confidentiality), but it also means that the argument for the promotion of 
cooperation is not applicable. 
To be sure, the parties might have chosen arbitration over litigation to 
resolve their dispute in a less costly fashion, and a lowering of costs can 
be a procompetitive benefit. As described above, though, parties might 
be willing to engage in arbitration without engaging in confidential 
arbitration.223 Moreover, arbitration of patent disputes can involve the 
same sort of extensive discovery and prolonged hearings as does 
litigation, so it is not evident that it is less costly than litigation. And 
when one compares any cost savings of arbitration with the increased 
costs to negotiations of confidentiality, it is even less clear that the 
arbitration-litigation cost calculus favors arbitration. 
IV. MEANS OF AVOIDING COMPETITIVE HARM 
The anticompetitive effects of confidentiality are, as suggested above, 
not essential to arbitration. Confidentiality also may not be essential to 
private settlements or licensing, though those practices might require a 
level of cooperation that would be furthered by confidentiality. In either 
case, to the extent that confidentiality would otherwise be an antitrust 
violation, the violation could be avoided by ensuring public access to the 
terms on which patent disputes are resolved. The following paragraphs 
discuss several ways in which such public access could be created: by 
parties or potential parties to confidentiality agreements, by courts or 
                                                     
223. See supra text accompanying notes 35–46. 
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agencies outside of antitrust law, by standard-setting organizations, or by 
arbitral bodies. 
A. Joint Action by Parties to Dispute Resolution 
The most obvious way to avoid confidentiality is for the parties to an 
arbitration, settlement, or licensing agreement to decline to agree to 
confidentiality. The parties could go even further and agree to public 
disclosure. For arbitration, that is in fact what U.S. patent law requires, 
even if the law does not provide sufficient penalties to force 
compliance.224 And significant licensing agreements and settlements are 
sometimes ultimately disclosed in securities filings, too, though only 
when their effects are material to one of the parties, and valuable 
information is often redacted.225 So to the extent that parties are, or 
should be, concerned about possible antitrust liability for agreements on 
confidentiality, liability would be easy to avoid. 
To the extent that parties to dispute resolution are concerned about 
antitrust liability, refusing to agree to confidentiality would have an 
additional benefit. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, article 101 TFEU, and 
corresponding provisions in other jurisdictions require an agreement for 
liability.226 Hence, in the absence of an agreement on confidentiality, 
there would be no antitrust violation under those provisions. What, then, 
if the parties had no agreement on confidentiality, but neither made the 
relevant information available? 
It still could be possible to infer an agreement, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court   has   indicated,   from   “direct or circumstantial evidence that 
reasonably   tends   to   prove   that   the   manufacturer   and   others   ‘had   a  
conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve an 
unlawful   objective.’”227 The Court has also described this standard as 
one  that  requires  “evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the 
[parties]   were   acting   independently.”228 The law in Europe is similar, 
though perhaps somewhat more likely to find an implied agreement. 
                                                     
224. See supra notes 50–51. 
225. See supra notes 61–64. 
226. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)   (“contract, combination . . . or conspiracy”);;  
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, May 9, 
2008,  2008  O.J.  (C  115)  47  [hereinafter  TFEU]  (“[A]greements  between  undertakings,  decisions  by  
associations  of  undertakings  and  concerted  practices.”). 
227. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 764 (1984). 
228. Id. 
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In the FRAND licensing context, it is not entirely clear how this test 
would be applied.229 If the royalty rate of an arbitration award were high, 
the patentee would presumably have the incentive to disclose it, in order 
to seek similar rates from other licensees. On the other hand, if the rate 
were high, then the high rate would also give rise to concerns that it was 
non-FRAND. Incentives would be mixed for licensees paying high rates, 
too. On the one hand, disclosure would make it more likely that 
competing licensees would pay similarly high rates; on the other, the 
disclosure of a high rate would inform competitors that the licensee 
paying such a rate is at a competitive disadvantage if others were paying 
lower rates. 
Low rates would also have ambiguous implications, though probably 
only for licensees. A patentee presumably would not want to disclose 
such rates both because it could lead to other low rates and because it 
could show that any previous or subsequent higher rates were non-
FRAND. For licensees, the decision would not be so clear. A licensee 
might prefer to disclose a low rate to demonstrate its superior 
competitive position, but doing so would give other licensees reason to 
argue for similar low rates as required by FRAND. 
Ultimately, it could be difficult to show an agreement by 
circumstantial evidence because each party could have its own 
incentives to keep licensing terms confidential. Presumably this in part 
at   least   accounts   for   the   general   noncompliance   with   patent   law’s  
requirement that arbitration awards be filed with the Patent and 
Trademark Office.230 That is, given that requirement, either party to an 
arbitration and accompanying confidentiality agreement could file the 
award and point to the legal requirement in defending any breach of 
contract action. The failure of parties to do so suggest that each party 
may have its own independent incentive for preferring confidentiality. 
It is also possible that the parties could engage in joint action that 
would maintain partial confidentiality while still retaining the benefits of 
transparency. The issue in the FRAND context is how the terms of one 
license compare to those of another, and the U.S. antitrust agencies have 
pointed   to   exactly   that   issue   in   their   discussion   of   the   “messenger  
model”   presented   in   the  Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in 
Health Care: 
Messenger models can be organized and operate in a variety of 
ways. For example, network providers may use an agent or third 
                                                     
229. See also supra text accompanying notes 67–68. 
230. See supra note 50. 
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party to convey to purchasers information obtained individually 
from the providers about the prices or price-related terms that 
the providers are willing to accept. In some cases, the agent may 
convey to the providers all contract offers made by purchasers, 
and each provider then makes an independent, unilateral 
decision to accept or reject the contract offers. In others, the 
agent may have received from individual providers some 
authority to accept contract offers on their behalf. The agent also 
may help providers understand the contracts offered, for 
example by providing objective or empirical information about 
the terms of an offer (such as a comparison of the offered terms 
to other contracts agreed to by network participants).231 
Although the usual context for the messenger model is, as the 
agencies   say,   “whether   the   arrangement   creates   or   facilitates   an  
agreement among competitors on prices or price-related   terms,”232 the 
purpose here would be different. Here the model could be used to create 
a situation intermediate between confidentiality and disclosure.233 
License terms could be disclosed to a disinterested messenger that could 
then provide advice about whether terms were FRAND without 
disclosing specific terms from one licensee to other licensees. Or the 
messenger could even disclose whether particular, confidential terms 
were sufficiently different from other, public terms to make disclosure 
competitively significant. The value of the messenger model here, 
instead of preventing collusion, would be to prevent potential harms 
from unnecessary disclosure while still insuring that confidentiality does 
not cause competitive harm. As will be discussed below, a somewhat 
similar approach has been taken in what has been referred to as the 
German  “confidentiality  club”  decision.234 
B. Action by One Party to Dispute Resolution 
Even if the parties have previously agreed to maintain confidentiality, 
what if one of the parties announced its willingness to disclose? 
Although that could constitute a breach of contract, the disclosing party 
could argue that the confidentiality agreement was one in restraint of 
                                                     
231. U.S. DOJ & FTC, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 
125–26 (1996). 
232. Id. at 126. 
233. A similar approach was adopted, though in a different context, by the Next-Generation 
Mobile Networks Alliance. See Jorge L. Contreras, Technical Standards and Ex Ante Disclosure: 
Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study, 53 JURIMETRICS 163, 178–79 (2013). 
234. See infra text accompanying note 257; Ward supra note 105. 
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trade and thus illegal.235 Disclosure or perhaps even an announcement of 
the willingness to disclose could be sufficient to constitute withdrawal 
from  the  “conspiracy,”  though  without  actual  disclosure  the  party  could  
continue to profit from the confidentiality, and some courts have found 
that to prevent effective withdrawal.236 
More interestingly, if one party—patentee or licensee—announced a 
willingness to disclose, that would place responsibility for nondisclosure 
on the other party. Could that then create antitrust liability for the non-
disclosing party? In the absence of a continuing agreement there would 
be liability only under the law as it applies to unilateral conduct. This 
intriguing possibility was suggested, though only in passing, in a recent 
discussion paper from an agency in India.237 In either the U.S. or Europe, 
antitrust liability for unilateral conduct requires a high degree of market 
power. As discussed above, given that the competitive effect at issue is 
not  access  to  the  patent  but  access  to  information,  the  relevant  “market”  
would be that for information about licensing terms.238 
Exploring the possibility of unilateral liability further, one could say 
that each party to a confidentiality agreement has a 50% share of the 
market for information about the terms between the two parties.239 But if 
                                                     
235. Sherman Act section 1 not only makes agreements in restraint of trade antitrust violations 
but  also  states  that  “[e]very  contract,  combination  in  the  form  of  trust  or  otherwise,  or  conspiracy,  in  
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”  15  U.S.C.  § 1 (2012). 
236. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
LAWS 48   (2010)   (“Courts   have   found   that,   even   where   there is proper evidence of withdrawal, 
continuing to receive benefits from the conspiracy, such as profits from illegal conduct . . . may 
negate  that  withdrawal.”). 
237. See GOV’T OF INDIA, DEP’T OF INDUS. POL’Y & PROMOTION, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & 
INDUS., DISCUSSION PAPER ON STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS AND THEIR AVAILABILITY ON 
FRAND TERMS 26  (Mar.  1,  2016)  (asking  “[w]hether   the  practice  of  Non-Disclosure Agreements 
(NDA) leads to misuse of dominant position   and   is   against   the   FRAND   terms”).   The   suggestion  
here might, as the reference to NDAs indicates, actually assume agreement rather than purely 
unilateral action. 
238. See supra section III.A. One  might  take  the  view  that  “information  about  licensing  terms,”  
either generally or for a particular patent, should not be considered a relevant antitrust market 
because such information is not generally for sale. That is also true for other informational products, 
though, as in the search-engine market. See generally John M. Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price 
Markets: Foundations, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 149 (2015). Moreover, one could view the frequent 
testimony provided by expert witnesses regarding royalty rates as evidence of the existence of a 
market for such information. 
239. In a somewhat analogous context of research and development markets, the U.S. antitrust 
agencies’   intellectual   property   guidelines   state   that   “[w]hen   entities   have   comparable   capabilities  
and incentives to pursue research and development that is a close substitute for the research and 
development activities of the parties to a licensing arrangement, the Agencies may assign equal 
market  shares  to  such  entities.”  U.S. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.2.3 (2017). 
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one party, A, to an agreement has announced a willingness to disclose, 
and if the other party, B, refuses to allow disclosure, then party B is 
unilaterally exercising complete control over the information. One might 
think, however, that the market should perhaps be broader than that for 
information about the terms between the two parties. As suggested 
above in the discussion of market power,240 if there is information 
available about the licensing terms between other parties, that 
information could lessen the need for other information about one 
particular license arrangement. But as noted, in that discussion it is 
impossible to know whether information about one license arrangement 
is   “reasonably   interchangeable”  with   information   about   others  without  
knowing the terms of the agreements. 
In any event, an antitrust challenge to unilateral action in this context 
would be analogous to the EU action against Microsoft.241 In that case, 
Microsoft refused to give access to interoperability information that 
would  have  allowed  application  developers  to  compete  with  Microsoft’s  
own applications on its Windows platform.242 Here, the claim would be 
that a party had refused to give access to royalty information important 
to competition in the licensee market. Such a claim would be most 
compelling, perhaps, if made against another licensee, but given that the 
competition at issue would be in negotiations with the patentee, the 
patentee would also have an incentive to cause that competitive injury. 
C. Action by a Disadvantaged Licensee 
Another possibility would be action not by the licensee that is party to 
the confidentiality agreement but by a potential licensee that could be 
disadvantaged by that agreement. For example, could the potential 
subsequent licensee simply enter into a license with a most-favored 
nation clause that required it to be granted terms as favorable as prior 
licensees? If enforceable, such a provision could indeed solve the 
competition problem (though it might create another243), but with 
confidentiality it is not clear how it would be enforced. 
                                                     
240. See supra text accompanying notes 171–72. 
241. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v.  Comm’n,  2007  E.C.R.  II-3601; see also Intergraph Corp. 
v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (denial by Intel of access of OEM to confidential 
information following patent infringement lawsuits by OEM against Intel). 
242. Microsoft, Case T-201/04 ¶ 36. 
243. Most-favored nation clauses raise antitrust concerns because by making a price reduction 
more costly (because the same reduction must be applied more broadly) it creates an incentive to 
maintain higher prices. See U.S. DOJ & FTC, PUBLIC WORKSHOP: MOST-FAVORED-NATION 
CLAUSES AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND POLICY (2012), https://www.justice.gov/atr/events/ 
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In effect, a most-favored-nation clause would be a private non-
discrimination provision. It would therefore be subject to all the 
problems of confidentiality discussed here. A more superficially 
attractive solution, perhaps, would be a provision that required the 
patentee to reveal the terms of prior licenses. Such a provision would 
confront the problem, though, that if the prior licenses were subject to 
confidentiality agreements, the patentee could not disclose them without 
breaching those agreements. In that respect, the patentee might in fact 
use confidentiality agreements to bind its hands in subsequent 
negotiations. 
D. Action by a Standard-Setting Organization 
In the FRAND context, most of the techniques above could also be 
incorporated in the commitments required by SSOs, as other 
commentators have suggested.244 That is, in addition to requiring 
patentees to commit to FRAND licensing, an SSO could also require the 
patentees to commit to disclosure of licensing arrangements. Although 
that would probably be sufficient, the SSO could even require the same 
of potential licensees, since SSO membership usually includes both 
patentees and potential licensees (especially because many firms are 
both). Although this sort of disclosure requirement would not be 
common in SSOs or trade associations, SSOs already require disclosure 
of patents and, often, as-yet-not-public patent applications, so the 
requirement would not be entirely novel. 
Moreover, an SSO would not have to go so far as to mandate 
disclosure. It could simply prohibit agreements on confidentiality. 
Although that might not result in disclosure in every case, because 
parties individually might lack the incentives to disclose, as suggested 
above,245 it would likely produce more disclosure. An approach that 
would arguably be less intrusive yet would be simply to mandate 
compliance   with   U.S.   patent   law’s   requirement   for   filing   arbitration  
awards, though it seems likely that if parties to arbitration are not filing 
awards even with a statutory mandate, an SSO rule is not likely to 
produce significantly greater compliance. 
                                                     
public-workshop-most-favored-nation-clauses-and-antitrust-enforcement-and-policy 
[https://perma.cc/U3ZY-FZJ3]; Jonathan B. Baker & Judith A. Chevalier, The Competitive 
Consequences of Most-Favored-Nation Provisions, 27 ANTITRUST 1, 20 (2013). 
244. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 19, at 41; Lemley & Shapiro, A Simple Approach, 
supra note 19, at 1141, 1145–46. 
245. See supra text accompanying notes 227–29. 
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Still, there is precedent for changes in SSO rules to address particular 
problems. Following the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
case referenced above,246 the Society amended its rules to avoid the sort 
of exploitation of its name that occurred in that case.247 And in the 
FRAND context, the Institute of Electrical Electronics Engineers 
recently adopted a new FRAND policy that addresses several issues that 
had given rise to controversy.248 SSOs might find it useful to follow 
these precedents and address confidentiality issues in their policies,249 
especially as market participants begin to raise them in litigation, as 
Apple has recently done in its case against Qualcomm.250 
Douglas Melamed and Carl Shapiro have recently argued for a greater 
focus on SSOs as the locus of possible antitrust liability.251 They argue 
that  “the  principle requires that the SSO and its members take effective 
steps to minimize the harm from the monopolies that their collaboration 
confers   upon   SEP   holders.”252 Although they do not point to the 
confidentiality problem specifically, instead looking at the problem of 
SSO policies more generally, they advocate an antitrust analysis similar 
to the one presented above for organizational agreements,253 which could 
be applied to an SSO that failed to forbid confidentiality as well as to 
individual parties to confidentiality agreements. 
E. Definitions of FRAND by Courts or Agencies 
Another possibility, though one only applicable in the FRAND 
context, would be interpretations of FRAND that require disclosure of 
previous licensing arrangements. As noted above, the Huawei v. ZTE 
decision mandated, as a requirement of FRAND compliance, that 
patentees   “alert   the   alleged   infringer   of   the   infringement   complained  
                                                     
246. See supra text accompanying notes 203. 
247. See CHARLES E. HARRIS, JR., MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD & MICHAEL J. RABINS, ENGINEERING 
ETHICS: CONCEPTS AND CASES 253–55 (2008). 
248. Contreras, supra note 22. 
249. As  Jorge  Contreras  notes,  “[o]bservers  of  these  disputes  have  long  wondered  why  standards-
setting organizations (SSOs) like IEEE have not simply clarified these issues in their patent 
policies.”  Id.  
250. See Redacted First Amended Complaint for Damages ¶¶ 74–78, Declaratory Judgment and 
Injunctive Relief, Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-cv-0108-GPC-MDD (S.D. Cal. June 20, 
2017). 
251. A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND Commitments 
More Effective, YALE L. J. (forthcoming).  
252. Id. at 16. 
253. See supra section III.B. 
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about by designating [the] SEP and specifying the way in which it has 
been   infringed.”254 By extending this disclosure requirement to prior 
license terms, the incentive for confidentiality would be eliminated, or at 
least lessened. 
Apple appears to propose this approach in its response to an EU 
consultation on standard-essential patents: 
A potential licensee should not face a penalty for refusing to 
take a license at the SEP holders demanded rate if a SEP holder 
has kept the potential licensee at an information disadvantage, 
for example, by refusing to provide sufficient information 
regarding actual past licenses for the SEP(s) at issue to evaluate 
FRAND compliance, failing to provide adequate disclosure of 
the basis for the SEP assertion, or refusing to describe the 
methodology used to calculate the requested royalty.255 
Charter Communications goes even further in its complaint against 
Rockstar   Consortium,   alleging   that   Rockstar’s   confidentiality  
agreements were among the acts that violated its FRAND obligations: 
Rockstar also used these restrictive non-disclosure agreements 
to extinguish communications between various participants in 
the  communications  industries.  Rockstar’s  actions  were  intended  
to prevent Plaintiffs from ensuring that any license negotiated 
would be on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms, 
facilitating  Rockstar’s  efforts  to  extract  fees  in  excess  of  those it 
was entitled to pursuant to its FRAND licensing obligations.256 
In light of the informational concerns of Huawei v. ZTE, this seems 
like a plausible approach. Indeed, it appears to be one adopted by the 
Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, which has said that in making a 
non-discriminatory licensing offer the patentee must provide proof of 
                                                     
254. Case C-170/13, Huawei Tech. Co. v. ZTE Corp., 2015 E.C.R. ¶ 61 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165911&pageIndex=0&doclang=
en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1089878 [https://perma.cc/3BXV-SQPV]. 
255. APPLE INC., Response to DG Grow Consultation on Roadmap for Standard Essential 
Patents for European Digitalised Economy 9 (May 8, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-
regulation/initiatives/ares-2017-1906931/feedback/F1753_en [https://perma.cc/Z6UK-Q7YV]. 
256. Complaint at ¶ 88,  Charter  Commc’ns,   Inc.,   v.  Rockstar  Consortium  US LP, No. l:14-cv-
00055-UNA (D. Del. filed Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/ 
antitrust-law/Committee%20Documents/Subcommittee%20on%20Standards/ 
20140117%20Charter%20v.%20Rockstar%20Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG9V-84PZ]. The 
complaint includes these and more allegations regarding the non-disclosure agreements in its 
breach-of-contract  claim,  where   it  alleges   that   the  defendants  “breached   their  express  and  implied  
FRAND  licensing  commitments.”  Id. ¶ 102. 
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prior licensing agreements.257 Although the court does not explicitly say 
that  failure  to  provide  that  proof  would  be  a  violation  of   the  patentee’s  
FRAND obligations, that   appears   to   be   the   implication   of   the   court’s  
statements.  And  if   the  plaintiff’s  offer   is  not  FRAND,   then   the  alleged  
infringer presumably would not be required to accept that offer or even 
respond with a FRAND counteroffer. 
However, the Düsseldorf court also suggests that any confidentiality 
concerns should be resolved by seeking a protective order from the 
court. As discussed above, the same court in another case later granted 
such an order, but it is unclear whether court action would be required, 
or which party would be required to seek it. The sensible approach 
would presumably be that the patentee should seek the order initially in 
order to comply with its FRAND obligations, but that the alleged 
infringer would be required to accept the order in order for it to be 
FRAND-compliant. Another issue is how extensive the disclosure 
should be. For example, suppose a patentee disclosed several licenses 
with higher royalty rates but failed to disclose licenses with lower rates. 
The extent to which this sort of cherry-picking would violate FRAND 
obligations is yet to be decided. 
F. Action by an Arbitration Body 
In the arbitration context, another possibility is that the arbitrators or 
the arbitration organization itself could mandate disclosure of the results 
of the arbitration. Particularly in the context of antitrust law, as Vera 
Korzun  has  discussed,   there  may  be   a   conflict   between   the   arbitrators’  
obligation   to   the   parties’   choices   in   invoking   arbitration   and   their  
obligation (if any) to mandatory law.258 A failure to comply with either 
obligation may result in unenforceability of an arbitral award, since a 
failure  to  comply  with  the  parties’  choices  may  invalidate  an  award,  and  
an award that is inconsistent with public policy may be unenforceable.259 
Korzun proposes that arbitrators themselves should take on, at least 
informally, the responsibility for ensuring consistency with antitrust law, 
and thus arbitral enforceability.260 
                                                     
257. Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG] [Higher Regional Court] Jan. 17, 2016, I-15 U 66/15, 
¶ 32; see also Ward, supra note 105. 
258. See Vera Korzun, Arbitrating Antitrust Claims: From Suspicion to Trust, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 867, 920–25 (2016). 
259. Id. at 921–22. 
260. Id. at 925. 
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The confidentiality problem is different from the one that Korzun 
discusses, though. Her concern is the enforceability of awards that are 
inconsistent with governing antitrust law.261 The problem addressed in 
this article is instead the competition problem presented by awards that 
are themselves presumably consistent with antitrust law but are kept 
confidential, thus raising a distinct antitrust issue arising from the 
confidentiality. Hence, there is no particular problem with enforceability 
of the arbitration award (unless, perhaps, the award included an order of 
confidentiality). Nevertheless, the arbitrators or the arbitration body 
could seek to persuade the parties to disclose the terms of the award, or 
least not to enter into a confidentiality agreement. To the extent that 
arbitral bodies were successful in such efforts, they could ensure that the 
parties are opting for arbitration rather than litigation for reasons other 
than seeking a competitive advantage. 
CONCLUSION 
Information is a vital element of markets and competition. That is 
particularly so for patents, whose value is often a matter of considerable 
uncertainty.262 Therefore, a market participant in a patent-dependent 
market that has privileged access to information can be at a considerable 
competitive advantage. It follows, then, that some efforts to achieve such 
an advantage may cause competitive harm, and if that harm is not 
outweighed by competitive benefits, those efforts could constitute 
antitrust violations. 
With respect to royalty rates specifically, the U.S. Supreme Court said 
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States that price 
is  the  “central  nervous  system  of  the  economy”  and  that  “an  agreement  
that interfere[s] with the setting of price by free market forces is illegal 
on  its  face.”263 Hence, an agreement that keeps information about royalty 
rates confidential is at the very least problematic. Although some degree 
of confidentiality may be beneficial in certain circumstances, as 
discussed above,264 it is not at all clear that those benefits outweigh the 
competitive harms of suppressing this market information. That is 
especially so given the public-policy implications of patent protection.265 
                                                     
261. Id. 
262. See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 1. 
263.  Nat’l  Soc’y  of  Prof’l Eng’rs  v.  United  States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1078) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
264. See supra section III.C. 
265. See supra section II.A. 
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These considerations become even more important in the context of 
FRAND licensing. In that context, firms agree collectively on product 
standards and agree that any patented inventions that are required to 
implement those standards will be licensed on fair, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory  terms.  The  “non-discriminatory”  element,  particularly,  is  
not likely to be very meaningful without availability of information 
regarding differences between the terms given to different licensees. 
And the effects here have more competition significance given the 
collective action involved in the standard-setting process. 
The fundamental points underlying this article are that the availability 
of information can have important competitive implications and that 
those implications are a proper subject of antitrust law.266 The relevance 
of information suppression has been recognized in antitrust law, even if 
typically in the context of agreements among large groups of 
competitors, as in Professional Engineers.267 And the informational gap 
created by dispute resolution outside the court system has also long been 
recognized, raising concerns of legitimacy,268 the integrity of the patent 
system,269 and discriminatory licensing terms.270 In confidential 
resolution of patent disputes these two sets of concerns intersect in a 
critically important part of the economy. 
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268. See supra text accompanying notes 55–57. 
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